[SydPhil] ANU-Usyd Visiting Speaker

[Brigitte Everett]

Hi everyone,



We are running a postgraduate speaker swap series this year between ANU and USyd. Two students from ANU will visit us here at USyd to give talks.


The first speaker, Szymon Bogacz, will give a talk at USyd on the 9th June at 3pm. It will be a hybrid event. Please find details and abstract below.

There will be drinks/dinner following the talk at a nearby venue.


All welcome, and we look forward to seeing you there!



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Time: 3:00-4:30 PM, 9th June (Fri)

In person: Seminar Room N494, the Quad

Zoom: https://uni-sydney.zoom.us/j/83453490326

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Presenter: Szymon Bogacz (ANU)



Alethic Paradoxes and Epistemology



According to a popular definition, a paradox is an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. In my talk, I will argue that this popular definition of a paradox conflates two distinct phenomena. On the one hand, a paradox is an argument or a proof: a series or a set of sentences or propositions. On the other hand, a paradox is reasoning or inference: a cognitive process of transitioning cognitive states. The conflation of these two distinct phenomena seems overlooked in the current studies of alethic paradoxes and has consequences for the methodology of answering or solving these paradoxes. I will argue that what it takes to answer or solve an alethic paradox can be understood in two distinct ways: logically (focusing on principles specifying what sentences or propositions semantically or syntactically imply what other sentences or propositions) and epistemologically (focusing on principles of reasoning specifying how one does or ought to form, maintain, and revise their cognitions). Using the liar paradox as an example of an alethic paradox, I will survey contemporary approaches to this paradox and argue that most of them understand the liar paradox to be an argument and propose logical solutions to this paradox. In contrast, epistemological approaches to alethic paradoxes remain underexplored yet may prove philosophically valuable.



Brigitte Everett and Wendy Xin

Philosophy Postgraduate Representatives

University of Sydney

brigitte.everett at sydney.edu.au

wan.xin at sydney.edu.au


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