[SydPhil] Notification: Alan Hajek, "Consequentialism, Cluelessness, Clumsiness, ... @ Wed 12 Oct 2022 15:30 - 17:00 (AEDT) (Seminars)

[Google Calendar]

You have an upcoming event

Alan Hajek, "Consequentialism, Cluelessness, Clumsiness, and  
Counterfactuals"
Wednesday 12 Oct 2022 ⋅ 15:30 – 17:00
Eastern Australia Time - Sydney



Philosophy Seminar RoomSimulcast via  
Zoom: https://uni-sydney.zoom.us/j/87937027507Abstract: According  
to objective consequentialism, the morally right action is the one  
that has the best consequences. (These are not just the immediate  
consequences of the actions, but the long-term consequences,  
perhaps until the end of history.) This account glides easily off the  
tongue—so easily that one may not notice that on one understanding it makes  
no sense, and on another understanding, it has a startling metaphysical  
presupposition concerning counterfactuals. I will bring this presupposition  
into relief. Objective consequentialism has faced various objections,  
including the problem of “cluelessness”: we have no idea what most of the  
consequences of our actions will be. I think that objective  
consequentialism has a far worse problem: its very foundations are highly  
dubious. Even granting those foundations, a worse problem than cluelessness  
remains, which I call “clumsiness”. Moreover, I think that these problems  
quickly generalise to a number of other moral theories. But the point is  
most easily made for objective consequentialism, so I will focus largely on  
it.I will consider three ways that consequentialism might be  
improved:1)    Appeal instead  
to short-term consequences of  
actions;2)    Understand consequences  
with objective probabilities;3)    Understand  
consequences with subjective/evidential probabilities.Subjective  
probabilities may be rationally constrained or not constrained by  
evidential probabilities. I will canvas a leading candidate for such a  
constraint: the principle of indifference. I will argue that it faces  
serious problems besides the well-known ones. But if the probabilities are  
not constrained, then subjective consequentialism does not deserve its  
title as a theory of moral action. I will consider another way in  
which they may be constrained: by objective probabilities. But even here,  
there be dragons.

~~//~~
Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/GUpDCE8wmrtW4AvK8cNd0iY?domain=calendar.google.com

You are receiving this email because you are an attendee of the event. To  
stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event.

Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to  
the organiser, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of  
their own invitation status or modify your RSVP.

Learn more https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/zb8UCGv0oyCJ3yDoNs7Zalo?domain=support.google.com
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.sydney.edu.au/pipermail/sydphil/attachments/20221006/42e88848/attachment-0001.htm>