[SydPhil] PHILO AGORA tomorrow, Nov 7

[peter_bowden at usyd.edu.au]

Thursday November 7 2013  Robert Mclaughlin Minds, Bats and Nagel's Dualism 

 

 

A central issue in the philosophy of mind is whether a complete account of
mental processes, consciousness in particular, could be given in terms of
physical processes This reductionist program or 'physicalism' has enjoyed
considerable currency among philosophers in recent times.

 

In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", Thomas Nagel advanced an iconoclastic
argument purporting to refute physicalism. As he put it, there is something
about an organism's having conscious experience -which he called the
'subjective character of experience' which is distinct from the 'objective'
matters with which physical science deals. The 'subjective' cannot be
reduced to the 'objective'. If Nagel is right, reductionist programs aimed
at giving a complete account in terms of 'the physical' are doomed from the
outset..But is he right?

 

 

Robert McLaughlin. was a member of the philosophy department at Macquarie
University for some thirty years working  mainly in philosophy of science
and philosophy of mind. He now teaches courses at Sydney University and the
WEA

 

Peter Bowden ( Dr.) 

peter_bowden at usyd.edu.au

[Ed.}  <http://www.tup.net.au/publications-new/Applied_Ethics.aspx> Applied
Ethics 

  <http://www.tup.net.au/publications-new/Applied_Ethics.aspx>
http://www.tup.net.au/publications-new/Applied_Ethics.aspx 

 

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