<span itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/InformAction"><span style="display:none" itemprop="about" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/Thing/Notification"><meta itemprop="description" content="Notification"/></span><span itemprop="object" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/Event"><div style=""><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="8" border="0" summary="" style="width:100%;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;border:1px Solid #ccc;border-width:1px 2px 2px 1px;background-color:#fff;"><tr><td><meta itemprop="eventStatus" content="http://schema.org/EventScheduled"/><div style="padding:2px"><span itemprop="publisher" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/Organization"><meta itemprop="name" content="Google Calendar"/></span><meta itemprop="eventId/googleCalendar" content="_84ok4dpg890j4ba16t2k4b9k6cr46b9p8h2k4b9m8crjici58cp48e266o"/><div style="float:right;font-weight:bold;font-size:13px"> <a style="color:#20c;white-space:nowrap" itemprop="url" href="https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/QVJWCq7BKYtGvKjNFZ7n65?domain=google.com">more details »</a><br></div><h3 style="padding:0 0 6px 0;margin:0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-weight:bold;color:#222"><span itemprop="name">TIM SMARTT</span></h3><div style="padding-bottom:15px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222;white-space:pre-wrap!important;white-space:-moz-pre-wrap!important;white-space:-pre-wrap!important;white-space:-o-pre-wrap!important;white-space:pre;word-wrap:break-word"><span>Title: Does Ought Imply Can in Epistemology?<p>Abstract: In this paper I consider whether ought implies can in epistemology. A number of epistemologists take it as a desideratum of their theorising that the insights of their work will be applicable to actual thinkers’ doxastic lives. That is, many theorists hold that there is something fundamentally normative about epistemology, and it ought to issue in some sort of guidance or implementable advice for real people deliberating about what to believe. In this paper I consider whether such an attitude necessarily amounts to endorsing an ought implies can principle for epistemology. I suggest the answer depends on what concept is expressed by the can relatum of the principle. I consider three different senses of an epistemic can - a metaphysical can, a voluntaristic can, and a psychological can - and argue that each importantly changes both the content and plausibility of a epistemic ought implies can principle.</p></span><meta itemprop="description" content="Title: Does Ought Imply Can in Epistemology?

Abstract: In this paper I consider whether ought implies can in epistemology. A number of epistemologists take it as a desideratum of their theorising that the insights of their work will be applicable to actual thinkers’ doxastic lives. That is, many theorists hold that there is something fundamentally normative about epistemology, and it ought to issue in some sort of guidance or implementable advice for real people deliberating about what to believe. In this paper I consider whether such an attitude necessarily amounts to endorsing an ought implies can principle for epistemology. I suggest the answer depends on what concept is expressed by the can relatum of the principle. I consider three different senses of an epistemic can - a metaphysical can, a voluntaristic can, and a psychological can - and argue that each importantly changes both the content and plausibility of a epistemic ought implies can principle."/></div><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0" summary="Event details"><tr><td style="padding:0 1em 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#888;white-space:nowrap" valign="top"><div><i style="font-style:normal">When</i></div></td><td style="padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign="top"><time itemprop="startDate" datetime="20180524T050000Z"></time><time itemprop="endDate" datetime="20180524T063000Z"></time>Thu 24 May 2018 15:00 – 16:30 <span style="color:#888">Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney</span></td></tr><tr><td style="padding:0 1em 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#888;white-space:nowrap" valign="top"><div><i style="font-style:normal">Where</i></div></td><td style="padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign="top"><span itemprop="location" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/Place"><span itemprop="name" class="notranslate">Muniment Room, University of Sydney</span><span dir="ltr"> (<a style="color:#20c;white-space:nowrap" itemprop="map" href="https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/GJgqCwVLQmiXnJ3xIKxaAa?domain=maps.google.com" target="_blank">map</a>)</span></span></td></tr><tr><td style="padding:0 1em 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#888;white-space:nowrap" valign="top"><div><i style="font-style:normal">Calendar</i></div></td><td style="padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign="top">Current Projects</td></tr><tr><td style="padding:0 1em 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#888;white-space:nowrap" valign="top"><div><i style="font-style:normal">Who</i></div></td><td style="padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign="top"><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"><tr><td style="padding-right:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222"><span style="font-family:Courier New,monospace">&#x2022;</span></td><td style="padding-right:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222"><div><div style="margin:0 0 0.3em 0"><span class="notranslate">Kristie Miller</span><span style="font-size:11px;color:#888">- creator</span></div></div></td></tr></table></td></tr></table></div></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color:#f6f6f6;color:#888;border-top:1px Solid #ccc;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:11px"><p>Invitation from <a style="" href="https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/pvFdCr8DLRtXOPlZIzhKYn?domain=google.com" target="_blank">Google Calendar</a></p><p>You are receiving this email at the account sydphil@arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects.</p><p>To stop receiving these emails, please log in to <a href="https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/pvFdCr8DLRtXOPlZIzhKYn?domain=google.com">https://www.google.com/calendar/</a> and change your notification settings for this calendar.</p><p>Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. <a href="https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/pah-Cvl0PoCoZpz8szL4hD?domain=support.google.com">Learn More</a>.</p></td></tr></table></div></span></span>