[SydPhil] University of Sydney Philosophy Seminar Series, Neil Mehta, (Yale-NUS College)

[Ryan Cox]

Hi everyone,

The University of Sydney Philosophy Seminar returns this week for an early start to semester 2.

This week's speaker in the seminar series is Neil Mehta, (Yale-NUS College)

The title of Neil’s talk is "A natural argument for contextualism". Here is an abstract for the talk:

In the debate between contextualist and moderate invariantist theories of knowledge, linguistic data have been the primary focus. In this paper, however, I come at the debate from a very different angle: I argue that contextualism is a much more natural theory – it is much better at respecting the objective metaphysical structure of reality – than moderate invariantism. From this, I draw two further conclusions: first, that contextualism is, in one important respect, much more charitable than moderate invariantism; second, that even if moderate invariantism is true, we should replace our invariantist concept of knowledge with its contextualist analog.

The seminar will take place **at 4:00pm** on Wednesday July 24 in the Philosophy Seminar Room (N494).

Please note the unusual time. The seminar immediately follows on from another seminar being hosted by the discipline of philosophy as part of a SSSHARC workshop (between 2:45 and 4:00 in the Philosophy Seminar Room (N494)). The speaker for this seminar is  Anca Gheaus (Central European University). Anyone interested in attending Anca’s talk is welcome to join. The title of Anca’s talk is “Feminism: An Ecumenical Approach”. Here is an abstract for the talk:

“Woman” has become a contested term: some believe it is, or should be used as, a sex term, others that it is, or should be used as, a gender term. According to the latter view, being a woman means to either occupy a certain social role, or to have a certain gender identity. Reasons that support employing “woman” as a sex concept rule out its employment as a gender concept, and the other way around. Moreover, “sex”, “gender” and “gender identity” are also subject to radical contestation. These cleavages are undergirded by metaphysical and ethical disagreements which reasonable individuals are unlikely to settle. They jeopardise the feminist project, defined as it has always been by reference to “woman”. They also jeopardise the ability of feminists and non-feminists alike to debate together practical matters concerning the treatment of individuals according to their sexual and gendered features, and, most notably, the issues of separate spaces. I suggest that the threat to the feminist project can be overcome if we think of feminism as a coalition against unjustified, and primarily against sexist, gender norms. I also argue that it is possible to engage in public debates without talking about “women”. In particular, states can and should offer justifications for their policies by reference to the discrete biological facts (such as hormones, chromosomes, gametes or sexual morphology) and/or gender facts (such as gender roles, gender socialisation, internalised gender norms). It is such facts that are already assumed, by the parties to the debate, to have normative significance. Following this suggestion would yield a complicated and messy normative picture, and would not in itself resolve substantive moral disagreements; but it would improve the chance to articulate the disagreements – thus getting the conversations unstuck – and may be the only way compatible with mutual toleration and respect.

Please also note that there will be two talks in the seminar series next week. One on Wednesday July 31 by Sukaina Hirji, (University of Pennsylvania) and another on Thursday August 1 by David Enoch, (Hebrew University of Jerusalem). Both talks will take place at 3:30 in the philosophy seminar room N494.

Enquiries about the seminar series can be directed to ryan.cox at sydney.edu.au<mailto:ryan.cox at sydney.edu.au>

Ryan Cox
Associate Lecturer in Philosophy
Discipline of Philosophy
School of Humanities
University of Sydney
ryan.cox at sydney.edu.au

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