[SydPhil] Neil Mehta at UNSW

[Michaelis Michael]

Philosophy Research Seminar UNSW Sydney

Tuesday 23rd July

Morven Brown building, level 2, room 209, at 12:30 pm

Neil Mehta
Associate professor of philosophy, Yale-NUS College

Paper title: "A natural argument for contextualism."

Abstract:

In the debate between contextualist and invariantist theories of knowledge, linguistic data have been the primary focus. In this paper, however, I come at the debate from a very different angle: I argue that contextualism is a much more natural theory – it is much better at respecting the objective metaphysical structure of reality – than standard versions of invariantism. From this, I draw some further conclusions: first, contextualism is much better than standard invariantism at allowing knowledge to have a distinctive normative significance; second, we should significantly increase our relative credence in contextualism over standard invariantism; and finally, even if moderate invariantism is true, we should replace our invariantist concept of knowledge with a better epistemic concept, such as a contextualist one.


Dr. Michaelis Michael

Associate Professor of Philosophy
Academic Board Member


School of Humanities and Languages
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
UNSW SYDNEY NSW 2052 AUSTRALIA
T: +61 (2) 9385 2183
F: +61 (2) 9385 3778
E: m.michael at unsw.edu.au
W: https://url.au.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/cDNFCWLVXkUz2JxqzS6teV3?domain=ada.unsw.edu.au


CRICOS Provider no. 00098G




"I believe in an open mind, but not so open that your brains fall out"  Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, 1935 to 1961
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