From glendasatne at gmail.com Mon Nov 25 14:16:41 2019 From: glendasatne at gmail.com (Glenda Satne) Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2019 14:16:41 +1100 Subject: [SydPhil] Reminder - Call for Attendance - Workshop on Mid-Level Cognition, Wollongong, 2-3 December Message-ID: This is a kind reminder for the upcoming workshop on Mid-Level Cogntion at UOW early next week. The participation in the workshop is free but registration is advised (please send a mail to gsatne at uow.edu.au by November 30th). Please see description and program below. Best regards, Glenda Satne *Workshop on Mid-Level Cognition* *Norms, Habits and Narratives* *December 2nd-3rd 2019.* *Research Hub, Building 19, Room 2072* *University of Wollongong* Debates on the nature of cognition have typically addressed either high level forms of cognition, such as thinking according to rules or principles, decision making and future planning, or, low level forms, which are involved in acting and perceiving when those do not require to dwell on plans, previous decisions or mental calculations. While the second predominantly focuses on cognitive abilities related to minimal forms of intelligence, whatever those may be, the former stresses the role of logic, rationality and propositional thought in sophisticated forms of cognition. Significant less attention has been paid to mid-level cognition, i.e. forms of cognition that might be thought to sit in between such sophisticated logically informed cognitive abilities and those which are non-rational, non-propositional, sitting at the low bar of the spectrum. Examples of such mid-level forms of cognition include habitual actions, such a driving and swimming, and a wide range of activities which non-linguistic children and/or non-human animals are able to perform such as sorting things by color and form, competence in basic arithmetical abilities such as subitizing and estimating, forms of temporal cognition that underpin the capacity to distinguish past and present experience, without parsing it in particular days and times, and so on. This workshop will explore diverse forms of mid-level cognition from multiple perspectives. It will reflect on the most adequate framework to identify and describe such phenomena and assess the potential of these lines of research to bridge the gap, pervasive in the literature, between minimal and full-fledged cognition. Some of the questions we aim to explore are the following: - Can we understand mid-level forms of cognition as embodied skills? If so, what are the best accounts of habitual embodied activity and how do they help account for the features of mid-level forms of cognition? - Do minimal, mid- and high level cognition involve different kinds of normativity? If so, how are we to account for their difference? - What is the relation between abilities for social interaction and the emergence of these mid-level forms of cognition? - Are narratives capacities a paradigmatic case of mid-level cognition? Do narrative capacities provide tools to explain the developmental path from minimal forms of cognition in young infancy to full-blooded theoretical reasoning? Or are these themselves already too cognitive demanding to contribute substantially to this task? - Does the thesis of the extended mind provide important or even essential tools for making sense of mid-level forms of cognition, in practice, in ontogeny and/or phylogeny? - Can mid-level cognition be accounted for from the perspective of predictive processing and active inference? *Program* *December 2nd 2019* 10.15-10.30 *Welcome* 10.30-11.45 Katsunori Miyahara, University of Wollongong *Skilled agency and no-mind* 12-13.15 Catherine Legg, Deakin University *Naturalizing Intellectualism: A Peircean Pragmatist Account* 13.15-14.15 Lunch 14.15-15.30 Glenda Satne, University of Wollongong *From Minimal to High-Level Cognition: placing Normativity in Nature* 15.30-15.45 Coffee Break 15.45 ? 17 Richard Menary, Macquarie University *Growing Minds: Getting the Exploratory Habit"* *December 3rd 2019* 11-12.15 Markus Pantsar, University of Helsinki *Proto-arithmetic, number concept acquisition and mid-level cognition* 12.15-12.30 Coffee Break 12.30-13.45 Massimiliano Cappuccio, University of New South Wales *Mid-level cognition in AI? Making sense of robotic actions with active inference and narrative practices* 13.45 ? 14.45 Lunch 14.45-16 Michael Kirchhoff, University of Wollongong *Active Inference and Epistemic Foraging: Scaling the ?middle? in mid-level cognition down and up* -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed Nov 27 14:59:46 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 03:59:46 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Chris Lean @ Thu 28 Nov 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEDT) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <00000000000007a4b505984c07b9@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Chris Lean Invasive Species and Biodiversity Realism Australia and New Zealand have implemented large invasive species control programs with Predator Free New Zealand and Australia?s pledge to kill 2 million cats by 2020. These programs have received heavy criticism, particularly from invasive species sceptics based in the USA and Europe. I aim to clarify and address the strongest argument that has emerged in the recent literature. Invasive species sceptics argue that the control of invasive species is a form of xenophobia, there is no sound reason to control invasive species or even prefer native species over non-natives. Preferences for natives are just prejudice, a prejudice not always held by the layperson. The public often shows affection to our alien compatriots; for example, the public support for Brumbies in Snowy Mountains, or the wish to preserve deer in New Zealand to maintain deer hunting. Critics of invasion biology have argued that invasive species do not destroy ecosystems but instead create ?novel ecosystems?. These novel ecosystems are claimed to be more biodiverse than extant ecosystems and across the globe most local ecosystem patches have increased in biodiversity! These more biodiverse ecosystems will provide more ecosystem services than extant ecosystems and, therefore, are more valuable. This position is only possible with the following assumptions about how we justify conservation. First, public interest or opinion should determine our stance towards the control of species. Second, the direct monetary value of ecosystem services is the only justification for conservation past public interest. Third, biodiversity can be flexibly defined. Four, the analogy with xenophobia in human migration is sufficient to reject invasion science. I reject all these assumptions. Once we see that there is more to conservation then opinion and immediate monetary gains, we can see that such slippery stances defending invasive species are not justified When: Thu 28 Nov 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * kristiemiller4 at gmail.com- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/QSYACANZvPiyo4P3uGzLtt?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/UAb7CBNZwLiQmjk9I66d76?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/UAb7CBNZwLiQmjk9I66d76?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/cr9ICD1jy9t2mqWKuAOgyi?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From m.merritt at unsw.edu.au Thu Nov 28 10:48:40 2019 From: m.merritt at unsw.edu.au (Melissa Merritt) Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 23:48:40 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] =?windows-1252?q?REMINDER=3A_Matherne_=7C_The_Role_of_?= =?windows-1252?q?Imagination_in_Kant=92s_Theory_of_Empirical_Concept_Form?= =?windows-1252?q?ation_=7C_UNSW_=7C_29_November_2019?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: [cid:image001.jpg at 01D540A7.7A20BE60] The Role of Imagination in Kant?s Theory of Empirical Concept Formation Proudly hosted by Philosophy, School of Humanities & Languages Abstract: Many have worried that Kant?s theory of empirical concept formation is circular. His account of the process through which we generate concept appears to presuppose the very concepts that are supposed to be generated. A number of commentators have attempted to rescue Kant?s view by appealing to the role that imagination plays in this process. According to this line of thought, it is not concepts, but rather a certain representation of imagination, e.g., a so-called ?schema? (Longuenesse, Allison) or an associative disposition (Ginsborg), that Kant presupposes for this process. While I think that this general strategy, viz., appealing to imagination, is key to understanding why Kant?s account of empirical concept formation is not circular, in this paper I argue that the role of imagination in this process has been misunderstood. My aim in this paper is thus to clarify Kant?s account of the contribution of imagination to empirical concept formation and how this helps avoid the charge of circularity. Bio: Samantha Matherne is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University. She specializes in Kant, Neo-Kantianism, Phenomenology, and Aesthetics. She is the author of Cassirer (forthcoming) for the Routledge Philosophers Series. She is currently writing a book about Kant?s theory of imagination and she is exploring the aesthetic theory of the phenomenologist Edith Landmann-Kalischer. [A person standing in front of a book shelf Description automatically generated] Speaker: Assistant Professor Samantha Matherne, Harvard University Event Details: Friday, 29 November 2019 12:30-2:00 pm Room 310, Morven Brown Kensington Campus, UNSW This is a free event, all welcome. Map reference: C20 Contact: Melissa Merritt e: m.merritt at unsw.edu.au UNSW Arts & Social Sciences UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia arts.unsw.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code 00098G, ABN 57 195 873 179 [Facebook] [Twitter] [Linked In] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 31018 bytes Desc: image001.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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The prize was first awarded in 2016 to Monima Chadha (Monash University). The 2019 prize was awarded to Louise Richardson-Self (University of Tasmania). The prize will be awarded during the Presidential Address at the annual AAP conference in July. This Prize is sponsored by Taylor and Francis, publisher of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy and the Australasian Philosophical Review. *Criteria of evaluation* The sole criterion for the prize is philosophical merit. The judging panel will consider and score entries on: ? Overall impression of merit ? Originality ? Scholarship ? Clarity of expression *Applications* The AAP invites entries/nominations for female professional philosophers who are actively engaged in an Australasian higher education and/or research institution. Entries/nominations may come from the author or from others. Entries must appear in print (or in final form if the publication is online only) in *2019* to be eligible. The prize is open to published papers or book chapters (i.e. chapters in edited anthologies) in any area of philosophy. Entries must be submitted as a PDF for blind review with all names, contact details, publication name and other identifying features redacted. The closing date for entries is* January 31, 2020 at 6.00pm AEDT*. Please note: late entries will not be accepted. Entries should be *submitted online* through the form available here: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/xwk9ClxwB5CJGpnRUG4Ldx?domain=aap.org.au Further information about the AAP Annette Baier Prize, including conditions of entry, can be found on the same page. The AAP reserves the right not to award the prize in any given year if a suitable candidate is not nominated. For general enquiries relating to the AAP Annette Baier Prize, please contact Chris Lawless: administrativeofficer at aap.org.au Chris Lawless Administrative Officer Australasian Association of Philosophy *My office hours are 9.00am - 5.00pm ACT/ACDT Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday & Friday. * https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Zo4ACmOxDQtwXDJyfOD-0i?domain=aap.org.au ABN 29 152 892 272 *The contents of this email message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information and may be legally protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient of this message or their agent, or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply email and then delete this message and any attachments. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, copying, or storage of this message or its attachments is strictly prohibited.* -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From administrativeofficer at aap.org.au Fri Nov 29 10:14:40 2019 From: administrativeofficer at aap.org.au (Chris Lawless) Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2019 09:44:40 +1030 Subject: [SydPhil] Call for Entries - AAP Innovation in Inclusive Curricula Prize Message-ID: *Call for Entries - AAP Innovation in Inclusive Curricula Prize* The Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) awards an annual prize of $500 for the development of innovative approaches to teaching philosophy. First awarded in 2014, the prize is offered with a view to exploring ways in which undergraduate courses in philosophy can build the understanding and practise of an inclusive discipline, concerned to foster equal participation in the profession. The aims of the prize are to encourage professionals developing and improving their teaching portfolios to consider critically how philosophy is presented, and to be innovative in implementing practices of teaching that off-set well-known disparities of participation in the discipline, for instance along race and gender lines. The prize will be awarded at the opening of the annual AAP conference in July. This Prize is sponsored by Taylor and Francis, publisher of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy and the Australasian Philosophical Review. *Criteria of evaluation* ? Significant innovation in curriculum that successfully promotes equity and diversity within the discipline, particularly with respect to underrepresented or marginalised groups in the profession. ? Innovation in pedagogy that successfully promotes broader participation in the discipline. ? Adoption of strategies for engaging with real-world issues and justice in the classroom. ? High quality in course design and delivery framed by the concern that philosophical education is also educating agency for valuing human diversity beyond the discipline and the classroom. *Applications* The AAP invites entries/nominations for *individuals, or groups of individuals*, teaching undergraduate philosophy courses in Australasian Universities. Entries/nominations may come from the creator or facilitator of courses or from others. Applications are only open for courses taught in *the previous five years *(2015 - 2019 inclusive). The closing date for entries is *28th February 2020 at 6pm AEDT*. Please note: late entries will not be accepted. Entries should be *submitted online* through the form available here: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/C2_2CoVzGQiNzxo0i1bfc9?domain=aap.org.au Further information about the AAP Innovation in Inclusive Curricula Prize, including conditions of entry, can be found on the same page. The AAP reserves the right not to award the prize in any given year if a suitable candidate is not nominated. For general enquiries relating to the AAP Innovation in Inclusive Curricula Prize, please contact Chris Lawless: administrativeofficer at aap.org.au Chris Lawless Administrative Officer Australasian Association of Philosophy *My office hours are 9.00am - 5.00pm ACT/ACDT Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday & Friday. * https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/MESaCp8AJQtr8XlBUDYyxl?domain=aap.org.au ABN 29 152 892 272 *The contents of this email message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information and may be legally protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient of this message or their agent, or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply email and then delete this message and any attachments. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, copying, or storage of this message or its attachments is strictly prohibited.* -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: