From debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au Mon Oct 28 09:26:17 2019 From: debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au (Debbie Castle) Date: Sun, 27 Oct 2019 22:26:17 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] HPS Research - Dr Peter Takacs- Assessing Fitness Functions in Selected Effects Accounts of Psychological Dysfunction Message-ID: View this email in your browser<*|ARCHIVE|*> [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/aqTzC3Q8Z2FQmmBNIglDWq?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] SCHOOL OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SYDNEY CENTRE FOR THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE PRESENTS SEMESTER TWO 2019 RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/D2VWC4QZ1RF1JJokcxJIsO?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] Dr Peter Takacs Theory and Method in Biosciences Group Charles Perkins Centre University of Sydney Assessing Fitness Functions in Selected Effects Accounts of Psychological Dysfunction Diagnosed medical disorders and pathologies?physiological, morphological, behavioral, or psychological?presume contextual impropriety or systematic dysfunction. Any such disorder accordingly implies an account of proper functioning. For etiological-historical accounts informed by evolutionary considerations (or ?selected effects accounts?), dysfunction occurs when a trait fails to perform the function whose effect on fitness was selected for in [N]ormal conditions and, thereby, explains the origin or subsequent retention of the trait. Selected effects accounts have recently been proposed for mental disorders, such as depression and generalized anxiety disorder. Two distinct approaches and seemingly inconsistent conclusions have subsequently emerged. One approach maintains that common mental disorders are objectively dysfunctional in an evolutionary sense and therefore focuses on elucidating the genetic mechanisms which maintain susceptibility. Others have argued that at least some common mental disorders might be developmental mismatches due to phenotypic plasticity and, although genuine disorders, are not dysfunctional from an evolutionary perspective. The cogency of either approach hinges on which components of fitness are maximized. I examine how the two approaches differ and whether the biological interpretations of the distinctive formal fitness functions can be reconciled. WHEN: MONDAY 28th OCTOBER FROM: 5.30PM WHERE: F23 LEVEL 5 FUNCTION ROOM [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/8bIhC5QZ29FG00vNFyMsF7?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] [Twitter] [Facebook] [Website] Copyright ? *|2019|* *|School of HPS*, All rights reserved. Our mailing address is: *|hps.admin at sydney.edu.au|* Want to change how you receive these emails? You can update your preferences<*|UPDATE_PROFILE|*> or unsubscribe from this list<*|UNSUB|*>. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Mon Oct 28 10:01:03 2019 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 10:01:03 +1100 Subject: [SydPhil] Michael Duncan, Thursday @ 3.00 " Is the principle of indifference really inconsistent?" Message-ID: <840D1B78-AF3E-4F2B-AAA4-739FD98A148A@yahoo.com> Thursday @ 3.00 in the Muniment Room Michael Duncan Title: Is the principle of indifference really inconsistent? Abstract: The principle of indifference, which says that the probabilities of two or more events are equal if there is no known reason to think that one will occur rather than any one of the others, appears to give inconsistent results in certain problem cases (the book paradox, Bertrand's chord problem, the perfect cube factory problem, the water-wine paradox). As a result, it is widely held to be false. I will attempt a general solution to the problem, which I hope might go some way towards saving the principle of indifference. All welcome. Associate Professor Kristie Miller ARC Future Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/feOHC6X13RtKoywwTph1jo?domain=kristiemiller.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arts.cave at mq.edu.au Mon Oct 28 18:00:48 2019 From: arts.cave at mq.edu.au (Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics) Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 07:00:48 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Registration Reminder: CAVE and MQ Law Workshop on Sex and Consent in the Age of #Metoo, 6-7 November, MQ City Campus Message-ID: Hi all, Apologies for cross-postings. This is a reminder of the upcoming CAVE and MQ Law Workshop on "Sex and Consent in the Age of #Metoo" When: 6-7 November 2019 Where: Macquarie University CITY CAMPUS, Level 24, 123 Pitt Street, Sydney, New South Wales 2000 This workshop brings together academic, government and NGO service-provider professionals to critically reflect on the state of affairs of the regulation of sexual conduct by the criminal and civil law, and the role of civil society in informing the governance of ethical sexual practices. The workshop will include an update from the NSW Law Reform Commission on the current review of consent laws, along with a series of ?notes from the field?: updates from relevant NGOs working directly in fields of sexual violence and the protection of sexual agency. Keynote speakers include: Professor Linda Mart?n Alcoff (City University of New York); Dr Yvette Russell (University of Bristol) Please register by 1 November (Friday) 5pm via this link: http://from.mq.edu.au/Ai0M0UUB00T2hjE00m0u18X Regards, Yves Dr Yves Saint James Aquino Research centre administrator https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/6cwLCxnMRvtALNKWC8lUeG?domain=yvesaquino.com Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE) Department of Philosophy Macquarie University Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia CAVE website: mq.edu.au/cave https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/xplYCyoNVrcM7VEBCMMY_9?domain=facebook.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue Oct 29 11:00:07 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 00:00:07 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: NOTE NEW TIME! Emily Hulme Kozey (UniMelb) @ Wed 30 Oct 2019 11:00 - 13:00 (AEDT) (Seminars) Message-ID: <00000000000091a7560596014c01@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: NOTE NEW TIME! Emily Hulme Kozey (UniMelb) Craftswomen of Justice: Plato?s Republic on the Natural Capacities of Women Plato?s argument for the inclusion of women in the guardian class in the Republic is a celebrated passage in the history of philosophy. All the same, reconstructing the details of the argument ? and especially the prima facie tension between his contentions that (1) women have all the same natural capacities as men and (2) they nevertheless are ?weaker? in every respect ? has proven challenging. The talk will focus on how recent work in Greek social history can shed new light on this argument. In particular, it has become clear that women played important economic roles as skilled practitioners in various crafts outside the home. I argue that Plato?s observation of women at work in this sphere informs his proposals. In the course of his argument, Plato assumes women could be specialized physicians and musicians because they already were playing these roles, and he extrapolates as a consequence that there?s no reason they could not be guardians, too. But he also fails to recognize that the infrequency of women?s accomplishments in various fields was not a consequence of differential distribution of natural abilities, but rather a function of the fact women were asked to take on many roles, rather that given the opportunity to focus on just one career?a violation of Plato?s own principle of specialization. As a result, his proposal is less radical than it could have been. NB: Tea starts at 15:15...there will be tim tams.... When: Wed 30 Oct 2019 11:00 ? 13:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room Calendar: Seminars Who: * sequoiah at gmail.com- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/3uXsCq7BKYt57y1lfZ-fnQ?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/3WcECr8DLRtvDRroczQ3m4?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/3WcECr8DLRtvDRroczQ3m4?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/dTXUCvl0PoC6ynEKSz4nMT?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed Oct 30 14:59:45 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 03:59:45 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Michael Duncan @ Thu 31 Oct 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEDT) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <00000000000068f3b3059618c351@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Michael Duncan Title: Is the principle of indifference really inconsistent? Abstract: The principle of indifference, which says that the probabilities of two or more events are equal if there is no known reason to think that one will occur rather than any one of the others, appears to give inconsistent results in certain problem cases (the book paradox, Bertrand's chord problem, the perfect cube factory problem, the water-wine paradox). As a result, it is widely held to be false. I will attempt a general solution to the problem, which I hope might go some way towards saving the principle of indifference. When: Thu 31 Oct 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Philosophy Common Room Calendar: Current Projects Who: * kristiemiller4 at gmail.com- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/hRrmCMwvLQTZ9QQyFwe2BY?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Hz-_CNLwM9iB922qH4ZRGq?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Hz-_CNLwM9iB922qH4ZRGq?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/b8JOCOMxNytKw66Luk5m-X?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu Oct 31 15:30:14 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 04:30:14 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund) @ Wed 6 Nov 2019 15:30 - 17:00 (AEDT) (Seminars) Message-ID: <00000000000044f82205962d4eae@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund) Can Parfit?s Appeal to Incommensurabilities in Value Block the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion? Abstract: Blocking the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion by an appeal to incommensurabilities in value, as has been suggested by Parfit (2016), is an attractive option. But the relevant incommensurabilities (?imprecise equalities? in Parfit?s terminology) need to be very thoroughgoing to obtain this result: they need to be ?persistent? in the sense to be explained. While such persistency is highly atypical and might well seem to be problematic, I suggest how it can be accounted for if incommensurability is interpreted on the lines of the fitting-attitudes analysis of value relations. On this account, two items are incommensurable iff it is permissible to have divergent preferential attitudes towards them; for example, if it is permissible to prefer one to the other but also permissible to have the opposite preferece. It is easy to provide a modelling of this kind for persistent incommensurability. However, even if Parfit?s main suggestion can thus be defended, one of his substantive value assumptions ? the Simple View regarding the marginal value of added lives ? should be given up to avoid implausible implications. NB: Tea starts at 15:15...there will be tim tams.... When: Wed 6 Nov 2019 15:30 ? 17:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room Calendar: Seminars Who: * sequoiah at gmail.com- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/3SuzCANZvPiWj42QIG9wXV?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/opYcCBNZwLi4vjBGH6dbpn?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/opYcCBNZwLi4vjBGH6dbpn?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/2qJxCD1jy9tVXq09hA4B_S?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Nov 1 15:00:12 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2019 04:00:12 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Sam Sphall @ Thu 7 Nov 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEDT) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <000000000000b47177059641002b@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Sam Sphall Title: The Permissibility of Procreation Abstract: I introduce an influential challenge to the morality of procreative parenting, which turns on the (putative) comparative superiority of adoptive parenting. I critique recent attempts by Luara Ferracioli and Elizabeth Brake to vindicate the permissibility of procreative parenting in the face of this challenge. I then outline some considerations in favour of procreative parenting that have been largely ignored in the literature. I remain, however, agnostic about the strength of these considerations. To conclude, I motivate a metaethical position that I call "deontic fictionalism," and argue that it gives us a useful perspective on debates like this one. When: Thu 7 Nov 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room, University of Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * kristiemiller4 at gmail.com- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/HqmaCxnMRvtAGpmDU8X5Ym?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/lCWvCyoNVrcMjG6KCMtvef?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/lCWvCyoNVrcMjG6KCMtvef?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/imVnCzvOWKi2PX8ETgxI4-?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: