From calendar-notification at google.com Tue Sep 24 15:30:09 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 05:30:09 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Jake Chandler (Latrobe) @ Wed 25 Sep 2019 15:30 - 17:00 (AEST) (Seminars) Message-ID: <0000000000006f17df059345d430@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Jake Chandler (Latrobe) Title: Metarevisions Abstract: This paper introduces the first method for uniquely extending any given iterated belief revision operator so as to handle so-called conditional beliefs as inputs. This allows us to model agents capable of acquiring new beliefs not only regarding matters of fact, but also regarding which rules of inference they ought to use in reasoning about these facts. The suggestion is discussed against the backdrop of past research on the topic, including the work of Kern-Isberner, Boutillier & Goldzsmidt, Hansson and Nayak et al. NB: Tea starts at 15:00! When: Wed 25 Sep 2019 15:30 ? 17:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room Calendar: Seminars Who: * sequoiah at gmail.com- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/r18qCJyp0qhOL3Q4SVu5H0?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/iHAkCK1qJZtKxzrACvZKDz?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/iHAkCK1qJZtKxzrACvZKDz?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/f24ICL7rK8tqMyYoCPStSL?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au Wed Sep 25 15:53:26 2019 From: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au (Heikki Ikaheimo) Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 05:53:26 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] UNSW PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR SERIES | Daniel Burkett: 'Let's Be Rational: A 'Fair Share' Approach to Individual Carbon Emissions' | 1 October 2019 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ________________________________ [cid:image001.jpg at 01D540A7.7A20BE60] Let's Be Rational: A 'Fair Share' Approach to Individual Carbon Emissions Hosted by Philosophy, School of Humanities & Languages Abstract: Much has been said about the moral obligations of states and industries to curb their carbon emissions. It might seem that such arguments would entail a corollary obligation for us, as individuals, to curb our own personal emissions. However, it is much harder to make a case for this than it first seems. So far, three main approaches have been presented in the literature?none of which, I contend, is entirely satisfying. My intention here is not to refute these approaches, but to present a fourth way: one that avoids the problems with its three alternatives, and?I argue?better captures our moral intuitions regarding what kinds of obligations we have as individuals given the current climate crisis. I contend that carbon emissions are best thought of as a scarce communal resource, and?as with other scarce resources such as a food, water, or medical supplies?are best suited to the adoption of a rationing approach. I argue that since most of us have already consumed our lifetime fair share of carbon emissions, we each have a compelling reason to minimise our personal emissions in any way possible going forward. Bio: Daniel Burkett is a postdoctoral research fellow with the Climate Justice stream of the Practical Justice Initiative. Daniel completed a law degree and a Masters in Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington, followed by a doctorate in philosophy from Rice University in Houston. His dissertation presents a novel agreement-based argument for the moral permissibility of punishment, and considers what this argument might mean for our current punishment institutions. Daniel?s current research interests are primarily in applied ethics and social and political philosophy - particularly where those subjects intersect with issues of state policy. [A person wearing glasses posing for the camera Description automatically generated] Speaker: Daniel Burkett, UNSW Sydney Event Details: Tuesday, 1 October 2019 12:30-2pm Room 209, Morven Brown Kensington Campus, UNSW This is a free event, all welcome. Map reference: C20 Contact: Heikki Ikaheimo e: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au UNSW Arts & Social Sciences UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia arts.unsw.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code 00098G, ABN 57 195 873 179 [Facebook] [Twitter] [Linked In] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 31018 bytes Desc: image001.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image003.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2332 bytes Desc: image003.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image004.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2436 bytes Desc: image004.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image005.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2390 bytes Desc: image005.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image006.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 4463 bytes Desc: image006.jpg URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Sep 27 14:59:48 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2019 04:59:48 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Michael Plant @ Thu 3 Oct 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEST) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <00000000000064a712059381c157@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Michael Plant : On The Importance Of Being Necessary Abstract: This paper motivates and attempts to defends Necessitarianism, the person-affecting view in population ethics on which the only persons who matter are those who exist whatever we do. I begin by outlining Ralph Bader?s recent arguments for the ?same-number? person-affecting view. I claim that, while his arguments are compelling, they undermine his proposed view and instead support Necessitarianism (the ?same-people? person-affecting view). Necessitarianism faces three putative objections: (1) it is intransitive, (2) it gets the wrong answer in ?Non-Identity? cases, (3) the view is implausible unless conjoined with the Procreative Asymmetry, but the Procreative Asymmetry is hard to justify. I show Necessitarianism isn?t intransitive and propose both that, on reflection, it gets the right answer in Non-identity cases and that accepting a Procreative Symmetry is not implausible. When: Thu 3 Oct 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * kristiemiller4 at gmail.com- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Um4tCQnzP0tVR97MFxBYuj?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/E30pCROAQotYOQNjcNn4RM?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/E30pCROAQotYOQNjcNn4RM?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/io2LCVAGXPtBZXMNsyexz-?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: