From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Mon Jul 22 07:52:29 2019 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2019 07:52:29 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Monika Betzler @ 3.00 Thursday: The limits of Empathy Message-ID: <5E736BC2-83A1-48D6-933F-6EB19497899B@yahoo.com> This Thursday (July 25) Monika Betzler will be talking about the limits of empathy. The talk will be in the Muniment room in the Main Quad at 3.00. All welcome. The Limits of Empathy Monika Betzler (LMU Munich) Abstract The aim of this paper (co-authored with Simon Keller) is to show that (affective) empathy often makes demands of belief. As we will put it, once we empathize we are under a rational requirement to have beliefs that cohere with our empathy. To empathize with another person is to imagine how her situation is like for her, and share in her emotions. Emotions involve ways of seeing the world; fear of cats, for example, involves seeing cats as dangerous. To empathize with another person is, in part, to see the world as she sees it. If I empathize with your fear of cats, then I am under rational pressure to believe that cats are dangerous. The connection between empathy and belief has far-reaching consequences for several debates about the moral and epistemic roles of empathy. Empathy carries distinctive epistemic dangers along with its epistemic benefits; there can be good reasons to avoid empathy; there are epistemic barriers to our ability truly to empathize with others, even those very close to us; the ideal of universal empathy is incoherent; and empathy cannot plausibly be taken to be the basis of morality. Associate Professor Kristie Miller ARC Future Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/oSV4CYWL1viv3YPMc0ZkQd?domain=kristiemiller.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au Wed Jul 24 12:44:14 2019 From: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au (Heikki Ikaheimo) Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 02:44:14 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] UNSW PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR SERIES | Melissa Merrit: Nature, Corruption, and Freedom: Stoic Debate in Kant's Religion | 30 July 2019 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: [cid:image001.jpg at 01D540A7.7A20BE60] Nature, Corruption, and Freedom: Stoic Debate in Kant?s Religion Proudly hosted by Philosophy, School of Humanities & Languages Abstract: Kant?s account of ?the radical evil in human nature? in the 1793 Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone is typically interpreted as a reworking of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. But Kant doesn?t talk about Augustine at all there, and only once refers (obliquely) to original sin. Instead, I argue, he gives us every reason to think that his account of radical evil is the product of a philosophically rigorous and historically sophisticated engagement with Stoic ethics. ?Radical evil? refers to the idea that our moral condition is ? by default and yet by our own deed ? bad or corrupt; and that this corruption is the root (radix) of human badness in all its variety, ubiquity, and sheer ordinariness. This discussion is framed on either end by explicit discussion of Stoic ethics, and it takes as its premise the Stoic idea that nature gives us ?uncorrupted starting points? (Diogenes Laertius 7.89). What sense can be made of the origin of human badness, given such a premise? This was debated among Stoics in antiquity; and since Kant accepts the Stoic premise, it is his puzzle, too. However, Kant suggests that the problem admits of no solution, insisting time and again that radical evil is incomprehensible. I explain how his particular transformation of his Stoic sources turns on this last point. Bio: Melissa Merritt is Senior Lecturer and ARC Future Fellow in philosophy at the School of Humanities and Languages at the University of New South Wales. She is the author of two books, Kant on Reflection and Virtue and The Sublime, both published by Cambridge University Press in 2018. Her current research aims to assess the significance of Stoic ethics and moral psychology for Kantian ethics and contemporary work on autonomy, moral realism, and cosmopolitanism. [A person wearing glasses and smiling at the camera Description automatically generated] Speaker: Melissa Merritt, UNSW Sydney Event Details: Tuesday, 30 July 12:30-2pm Morven Brown Building, Level 2, Room 209 Kensington Campus, UNSW This is a free event, all welcome. Map reference: C20 Contact: Heikki Ikaheimo e: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au UNSW Arts & Social Sciences UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia arts.unsw.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code 00098G, ABN 57 195 873 179 [Facebook] [Twitter] [Linked In] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 31018 bytes Desc: image001.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image002.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 7573 bytes Desc: image002.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image003.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2332 bytes Desc: image003.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image004.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2436 bytes Desc: image004.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image005.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2390 bytes Desc: image005.jpg URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed Jul 24 15:00:13 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 05:00:13 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Monika Betzler (LMU) @ Thu 25 Jul 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEST) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <0000000000002f9855058e662f3d@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Monika Betzler (LMU) The Limits of Empathy Monika Betzler (LMU Munich) Abstract The aim of this paper (co-authored with Simon Keller) is to show that (affective) empathy often makes demands of belief. As we will put it, once we empathize we are under a rational requirement to have beliefs that cohere with our empathy. To empathize with another person is to imagine how her situation is like for her, and share in her emotions. Emotions involve ways of seeing the world; fear of cats, for example, involves seeing cats as dangerous. To empathize with another person is, in part, to see the world as she sees it. If I empathize with your fear of cats, then I am under rational pressure to believe that cats are dangerous. The connection between empathy and belief has far-reaching consequences for several debates about the moral and epistemic roles of empathy. Empathy carries distinctive epistemic dangers along with its epistemic benefits; there can be good reasons to avoid empathy; there are epistemic barriers to our ability truly to empathize with others, even those very close to us; the ideal of universal empathy is incoherent; and empathy cannot plausibly be taken to be the basis of morality. When: Thu 25 Jul 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/hFTpC0YZWVF94yoZCwY26H?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/4hAlCgZowLHjNB0pSoDFLD?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/4hAlCgZowLHjNB0pSoDFLD?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/T_dlCjZrzqHwAO5Pi5HFJk?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: