From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Mon Apr 22 15:03:42 2019 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 15:03:42 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Ryan Cox: Wednesday 3.30: The Deliberative Theory of Self-Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits Message-ID: <2977030D-0E28-416B-921F-A45D41E14F34@yahoo.com> Ryan Cox?s curent project's seminar will be held on Wednesday, instead of Thursday, at the usual departmental seminar time, in the Muniment Room. All welcome. Title: The Deliberative Theory of Self-Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits Abstract: The deliberative theory of self-knowledge---by which I mean the theory of self-knowledge articulated and defended by Richard Moran in Authority and Estrangement and elsewhere---is simultaneously one of the most interesting and important theories of self-knowledge among contemporary theories of self-knowledge and one of the most obscure, incomplete, and misunderstood theories. The obscurity and incompleteness of the theory makes it particularly difficult to evaluate a range of "scope objections" to the theory, objections which claim that the theory is limited in scope in one way or another and so must either be interesting and important not as the one true theory of self-knowledge in its intended domain, but only with respect to only a particular domain of self-knowledge, or perhaps even only with respect to issues outside of traditional concerns with self-knowledge. In this paper I defend the deliberative theory against such scope objections, arguing that, when properly understood, the deliberative theory has exactly the scope of application that a theory with its intended domain---that is, a theory of the distinctive means by which we come to know our own attitudes---should have. Associate Professor Kristie Miller ARC Future Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/g8RcCD1jy9tqZoMEsW22O_?domain=kristiemiller.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au Tue Apr 23 22:45:33 2019 From: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au (Heikki Ikaheimo) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 12:45:33 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] UNSW PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR SERIES | Neil Levy: The Suspicious Correlation | 30 April 2019 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ________________________________ [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/brGSCp8AJQtm0JkyHPAOVl?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] The Suspicious Correlation Hosted by the School of Humanities & Languages (Philosophy) Abstract: Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These actions have consequences. I will argue that the consequences of the actions entailed by our moral judgments are suspiciously benign: on controversial issues, each side assesses these consequences, measured in dispute-independent goods, as significantly better than the consequences of behaving in the ways their opponents recommend. This remains the case even when we have not formed our moral judgment by assessing consequences. I will suggest that the evidence indicates that our perception of the consequences of acting as recommended by our moral judgments is motivated, such that the warrant of such assessments is lower than we might have thought. The suspicion correlation between our moral judgments and our assessments of the implicated facts provides higher-order evidence that should lead us to reduce our confidence in these assessments. Bio: Neil Levy is professor of philosophy at Macquarie University and a senior research fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. [A person smiling for the camera Description automatically generated] Speaker: Professor Neil Levy, Macquarie University Event Details: Tuesday, 30 April 2019 12:30 ? 2:00 pm Room 310, Morven Brown Kensington Campus, UNSW No RSVP required. Map reference: C20 Contact: Heikki Ikakeimo e: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au UNSW Arts & Social Sciences UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia arts.unsw.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code 00098G, ABN 57 195 873 179 [Facebook] [Twitter] [Linked In] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image002.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 31019 bytes Desc: image002.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image003.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 5150 bytes Desc: image003.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image004.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2333 bytes Desc: image004.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: image006.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2391 bytes Desc: image006.jpg URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu Apr 25 15:29:57 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 05:29:57 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Ryan Cox @ Wed 1 May 2019 15:30 - 17:00 (AEST) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <000000000000cd71cf0587541b2f@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Ryan Cox Title: The Deliberative Theory of Self-Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits Abstract: The deliberative theory of self-knowledge---by which I mean the theory of self-knowledge articulated and defended by Richard Moran in Authority and Estrangement and elsewhere---is simultaneously one of the most interesting and important theories of self-knowledge among contemporary theories of self-knowledge and one of the most obscure, incomplete, and misunderstood theories. The obscurity and incompleteness of the theory makes it particularly difficult to evaluate a range of "scope objections" to the theory, objections which claim that the theory is limited in scope in one way or another and so must either be interesting and important not as the one true theory of self-knowledge in its intended domain, but only with respect to only a particular domain of self-knowledge, or perhaps even only with respect to issues outside of traditional concerns with self-knowledge. In this paper I defend the deliberative theory against such scope objections, arguing that, when properly understood, the deliberative theory has exactly the scope of application that a theory with its intended domain---that is, a theory of the distinctive means by which we come to know our own attitudes---should have. When: Wed 1 May 2019 15:30 ? 17:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: The Muniment Room Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/fZqEC5QZ29FENvw6Fz_UpN?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/1aXAC6X13RtzwDZyh6EFhK?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/1aXAC6X13RtzwDZyh6EFhK?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/p_fzC71ZgLtl7qnZsBNnGR?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Apr 26 15:00:01 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 05:00:01 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Rob Sternhell @ Thu 2 May 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEST) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <0000000000009f7fc5058767ce23@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Rob Sternhell Does the philosophy of mind have a combination problem? Abstract: Panpsychism is the view that mentality is ubiquitous and that our minds are combinations of the many smaller minds. One major objection posited to this view is the combination problem, which states that many minds cannot combine to form a another mind. Angela Mendelovici (forthcoming) argues that the combination problem applies to all theories of mind. If true, then panpsychists are in a much better dialectical position, or the philosophy of mind has considerably more work to do, or both. In this paper, I will assess whether it is right to claim that dualists, physicalists, and panpsychists have combination problems and whether they can be considered as equally problematic and difficult to solve. I will argue that at least physicalists have ways to refute combination problems by appealing to different standard of constitution for experience. Therein, I argue that Mendelovici?s arguments do not vindicate panpsychism but do suggest constraints on our accounts of the constitution of experience. When: Thu 2 May 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Main Quad Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/2EYUCBNZwLijKv3kHzOJFX?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/3wC_CD1jy9tqAXQWu5J4S0?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/3wC_CD1jy9tqAXQWu5J4S0?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/vAkMCE8kz9tLxBKzHpFqJ-?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: