From debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au Mon Mar 25 12:35:48 2019 From: debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au (Debbie Castle) Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 01:35:48 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] =?utf-8?q?Reminder_-__25th_March_2019__HPS_Research_Se?= =?utf-8?q?minar_-_Emily_Kern=C2=A0_-_=22The_Speaking_Ape=3A_Language_and_?= =?utf-8?q?the_Logic_of_Origins_in_the_Nineteenth_Century=2E=E2=80=9D?= Message-ID: [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/x_B3C71ZgLt4VMovF8c3l5?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] SCHOOL OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Held in conjunction with the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science SEMESTER ONE 2019 RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES MONDAY 25th MARCH 2019 [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/hpyfC81Zj6tDP3Llf1xxtL?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] DR EMILY KERN Emily Kern is a historian of modern global science who specializes in the history of human evolution and paleoanthropology. FACULTY OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES "The Speaking Ape: Language and the Logic of Origins in the Nineteenth Century.? Until the early 1950s, international scientific consensus placed the cradle of humankind in central Asia. This paper traces the origins of the ?out of Asia? hypothesis in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, arguing that the philological tradition played a major, unrecognized role in the development of evolutionary theory WHERE: LEVEL 5 FUNCTION ROOM F23 (NEW) ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AT THE ENTRANCE TO CITY ROAD CAMPERDOWN CAMPUS WHEN: MONDAY 25TH MARCH START: 5.30PM All Welcome | No Booking Required | Free Copyright ? *2019* *School of HPS, All rights reserved. Want to change how you receive these emails? You can update your preferences or unsubscribe from this list This email was sent to debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au why did I get this? unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences Unit for History and Philosophy of Science ? University of Sydney ? Sydney, NSW 2006 ? Australia [Email Marketing Powered by Mailchimp] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- --------- SydPhil mailing list To unsubscribe, change your membership options, find answers to common problems, or visit our online archives, please go to the list information page: https://mailman.sydney.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil From debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au Tue Mar 26 11:44:29 2019 From: debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au (Debbie Castle) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 00:44:29 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] HPS Research Seminar - Prof Phil Gerrans - Real Feelings, Artificial Emotions. Hard Problems for Soft Bodies Message-ID: [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Ia_9ClxwB5C06RK6SGD1km?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] SCHOOL OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Held in conjunction with the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science SEMESTER ONE 2019 RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES MONDAY 1st April 2019 [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/ZV6JCmOxDQtBkyYkuOsC1Z?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] Professor Philip Gerrans Philosophy Faculty of Arts University of Adelaide Real Feelings, Artificial Emotions. Hard Problems for Soft Bodies. In a recent review article Matthew Leiberman says ?relative to all the other topics of psychology, the emotional domain is where sidestepping consciousness does the greatest harm to the thing studied?. As a good neuroscientist he supports this idea with a thought experiment derived from AI. When we ?wonder whether androids actually have emotions?the answer comes down to one thing and only one thing ? do they have emotional experience? They may have the most exquisitely contextually sensitive emotional expressions and actions and they can have all the physiology of emotion, but if they do not have the experience of emotion then it is just an incredibly sophisticated simulation ? the appearance of emotion, but not actual emotion? This paper suggests that Lieberman is partly right and partly wrong. If in fact androids or AI systems did have the ?all the physiology of emotion? regulated by the right neurocomputational architecture the gap he imagines between simulated and actual emotion might vanish. But recent successes and failures in AI (especially Deep Learning networks) and advances in understanding the relationship between emotional experience and physiology provide reasons for skepticism. It is not just that AI systems often have no bodies to regulate, but that their neurocomputational regulatory resources are not suited to the task of producing emotional experience. WHERE: LEVEL 5 FUNCTION ROOM F23 (NEW) ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AT THE ENTRANCE TO CITY ROAD CAMPERDOWN CAMPUS WHEN: MONDAY 1st April 2019 START: 5.30PM All Welcome | No Booking Required | Free Copyright ? *2019* *School of HPS, All rights reserved. Want to change how you receive these emails? You can update your preferences<*|UPDATE_PROFILE|*> or unsubscribe from this list<*|UNSUB|*> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue Mar 26 15:30:12 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 04:30:12 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Paul Griffiths (Sydney) @ Wed 27 Mar 2019 15:30 - 17:00 (AEDT) (Seminars) Message-ID: <000000000000e7c42d0584f7c610@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Paul Griffiths (Sydney) Title:There is no case for Neo-Aristotelianism Abstract: Neo-Aristotelian theories of the organism have had a significant revival in recent years, with applications in ethics and in the philosophy of medicine. They have been widely criticised on methodological grounds, and for being unable to deliver plausible normative results. Here I present some more basic objections. Neo-Aristotelianism contradict the longstanding consensus in both biology and philosophy of biology that species do not have essences or ?forms?. Species are simply collections of populations of varying individuals. When confronted with this consensus, Neo-Aristotelians point to a body of work by Michael Thompson and others which purports to show that biology implicitly depends on a conception of Aristotelian form and would be impossible without it. In this paper I first show that there is no substance to these arguments. I do this by simply describing some species and what we know about them. The aspects of descriptive biology that neo-Aristotelians allege make no sense unless we invoke the idea of species-form make perfect sense without NB: Tea will start at 3pm When: Wed 27 Mar 2019 15:30 ? 17:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Luara Ferracioli- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/z1_1CYWL1viEmNqjs0BCoS?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/scc5CZYM2VFrADLXIjLow5?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/scc5CZYM2VFrADLXIjLow5?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/6UrVC1WZXri2xkoLfpIFjW?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed Mar 27 15:00:15 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 04:00:15 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Ofer Gal @ Thu 28 Mar 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEDT) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <000000000000a01b3d05850b7928@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Ofer Gal From the Optics to the Meditations: The Meaning of Descartes? Doubt In 1604 Kepler published his Optical Part of Astronomy, dramatically changing the role of optics and the fundamental concept of vision. Instead of a window through which visual rays in-formed reason about its surrounding objects, the eye became a screen on which light painted images of no inherent cognitive value. Descartes? life-long project of natural epistemology is an attempt to answer Kepler?s challenge to the philosophers: to explain how these meaningless stains of light, purely causal effects, can signify. In the Meditations he takes on the most devastating worry arising from Kepler?s optics and the naturalization of the senses: that we may be completely wrong concerning what happens behind the screen. In his argument, Descartes reverses the hierarchy between epistemology and philosophy of nature: it is the causal nature of sensations that created the worry, he explains, and it is this causal nature that makes it spurious; it is logically impossible that nature, ?the ordered network of created things,? would causally produce systematically wrong representations of itself. When: Thu 28 Mar 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/2dZfC71ZgLt49DgJu8SOnr?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Tka8C81Zj6tDxoGKH12GnF?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Tka8C81Zj6tDxoGKH12GnF?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/vZ_JC91ZkQtLPG0pC329Jb?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu Mar 28 15:30:11 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 04:30:11 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Markos Valaris (UNSW) @ Wed 3 Apr 2019 15:30 - 17:00 (AEDT) (Seminars) Message-ID: <00000000000087ff350585200267@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Markos Valaris (UNSW) Title: Reasoning, Rule-Following, and the ?Taking? Condition Abstract: Reasoning is a way of forming or revising attitudes such as beliefs and intentions. But what sets reasoning apart from non-rational ways of forming or revising attitudes? According to a popular approach, reasoning consists in the exercise of dispositions to follow rules. In this paper I examine and reject attempts to make this idea precise. Rule-following theories, as I argue, struggle to capture the defeasibility of most of our reasoning. Taking defeasibility seriously, I suggest, should lead us to endorse what Paul Boghossian calls the Taking Condition, that is, the condition that reasoning requires taking it that your response is supported or warranted by your circumstances. NB: Tea starts at 3pm When: Wed 3 Apr 2019 15:30 ? 17:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Luara Ferracioli- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/qvwBCgZowLHOVjBPhNzsBU?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/CSIOCjZrzqHKpwOlsRzMrE?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/CSIOCjZrzqHKpwOlsRzMrE?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/FPw7Ck8vAZt8mRwYHQiA4A?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Mar 29 15:00:00 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 04:00:00 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Geraint Lewis @ Thu 4 Apr 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEDT) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <0000000000006d4b8e058533b4b8@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Geraint Lewis The physical properties of the cosmos appear to be fine-tuned for the complexity necessary for life, leading some to conclude that ours is but one of many universes in what is known as the multiverse. But just how fine-tuned are we, and just how sterile is the rest of the multiverse? In this talk, we?ll explore the notion of fine-tuning, and show how tweaking some of the physical laws would be disastrous for life, but others would leave us relatively unscathed. We will find that fine-tuning remains an unsolved problem in physics, and we might be faced with the issue that it may never be solved, leaving us with some interesting philosophical conundrums, especially in terms of the way we do science. When: Thu 4 Apr 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/eZOGCANZvPiLYKXVuGdUqb?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/KDTeCBNZwLipoXrAh6EI-a?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/KDTeCBNZwLipoXrAh6EI-a?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/cbRBCD1jy9tNPLzMTAPmbN?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au Fri Mar 29 15:06:31 2019 From: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au (Heikki Ikaheimo) Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 04:06:31 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Michael Devitt at UNSW | The reference of proper names: Testing usage and intuitions | 8 April 2019 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Fd9lC1WZXri2Rr9ghLlrvj?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] The reference of proper names: Testing usage and intuitions. Hosted by the School of Humanities & Languages (Philosophy) Abstract: Experiments on theories of reference have mostly tested referential intuitions. We think that experiments should rather be testing linguistic usage. Substantive Aim (I): to test classical description theories of proper names against usage by ?elicited production?. Our results count decisively against those theories. Methodological Aim (I): Machery et al. (2009) claim that truth-value judgment experiments test usage. Mart? (2014) disagrees. We argue that Machery et al. are right and offer some results that are consistent with that conclusion. Substantive aim (II): Machery et al. provide evidence that the usage of a name varies, being sometimes descriptive, sometimes not. In seven out of eight tests of usage, we did not replicate this variation. Methodological Aim (II): to test the reliability of referential intuitions by comparing them with linguistic usage. Earlier studies led us to predict that we would find those intuitions unreliable, but we did not. Our results add to evidence that tests of referential intuition are susceptible to unpredictable wording effects. Bio: Michael Devitt's primary interests include philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology. Author of books Designation (Columbia University Press, 1981), Coming to Our Senses (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Realism and Truth. (Blackwell, 1984) Prof. Devitt was a student of the famous American empiricist Willard Van Orman Quine at Harvard, where he earned his Ph.D., and has argued his realist position steadily over the years. His Realism and Truth is now in its third printing. In Ignorance of Language (2008) he criticizes Chomskian views of the place of language in the mind. Since his first book, Designation (1981), he has been embroiled in a revolution in the ?theory of reference,? a revolution that was instigated by the world-famous philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, who is also a member of the doctoral faculty in philosophy at the Graduate Center. [A person standing in front of a book shelf Description automatically generated] Speaker: Michael Devitt, Distinguished Professor, Graduate Center, CUNY Event Details: Monday, 8 April 2019 5:00 ? 7:00 pm Room 310, Morven Brown Kensington Campus, UNSW No RSVP required. Map reference: C20 Contact: Peter Slezak e: p.slezak at unsw.edu.au UNSW Arts & Social Sciences UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia arts.unsw.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code 00098G, ABN 57 195 873 179 [Facebook] [Twitter] [Linked In] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 31019 bytes Desc: image001.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image003.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2333 bytes Desc: image003.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image004.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2437 bytes Desc: image004.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image005.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2391 bytes Desc: image005.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image006.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 38304 bytes Desc: image006.jpg URL: From jp.deranty at mq.edu.au Sat Mar 30 11:29:35 2019 From: jp.deranty at mq.edu.au (Jean-Philippe Deranty) Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2019 00:29:35 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Thomas Ebke @MQ Tue 2 April 1-2pm Message-ID: Dr Thomas Ebke (University of Potsdam) will present a paper: "Notes towards a metaphysics of difference. From Hyppolite to Deleuze" Macquarie University, 2 April, 1pm, Seminar Room 5.212 ABSTRACT: In his critical review of Jean Hyppolite's study Logic and Existence (1953), Gilles Deleuze already seems to break through to and to define in a nutshell the systematic problem around which is entire philosophy of difference revolves. Aside from its merit of dismantling the reduction of Hegelian speculative dialectics to philosophical anthropology, Hyppolite's work, according to Deleuze, conjures up a conception of difference that precedes and subverts Hegel's focus on mediation and contradiction. It is in fact at this early stage of his career that Deleuze explicitly introduces the formula of an "ontology of difference", which he reconstructs as the very upshot of Hyppolite's reading of Hegel. Following Hyppolite, the concept, in realizing itself, does so only in a twisted, inflected way to the extent that, while being constitutes itself as the being of the concept, the concept reflects itself only i the immediacy of being, by remaining implicated in immediate being as the immanent difference from itself, that is the concept. However, the ambivalence within Deleuze's assessment of Hyppolite's Hegelian configuration becomes clearly noticeable. In Deleuze's perspective, Hyppolite's text falls apart into two divergent projects: Whereas in the first part Hyppolite elaborates a philosophy of expression qua language in which expressivity is irreducible to contradiction, the second half of the book, in the eyes of Deleuze, turns out to be unfaithful to this approach. It is in this context that Deleuze attributes to Hyppolite the crucial flaw of speculative dialectics, namely the choice to "[carry] difference up to the absolute" (Deleuze), to ultimately sublate difference into contradiction. In my paper, I wish to argue against this picture of Hyppolite's conception as a dualistically torn idealism. As it were, my strategy will be to explore the fecundity of the tension stigmatized by Deleuze. Rather than pushing difference all the way back down from contradiction to thereby obtain "diff?rence pure" (Deleuze) as a generative principle which in itself is prior to empirical diversity, it may be promising to return to Hyppolite's view of difference as an expressivity below the concept, but above empirical diversity. For that matter, I wish to describe Hyppolite as the "vanishing" (or even the vanished) mediator of a metaphysics of difference whose blueprint his particular Hegelianism incorporates. It shall be the objective of my talk to spell out the systematic structure of a metaphysics of difference which Hyppolite seems to have bequeathed to contemporary thought only between the lines of his Hegelianism. Prof. Jean-Philippe Deranty Department of Philosophy Faculty of Arts Level 2, The Australian Hearing Hub 16 University Avenue MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY, NSW 2109 T: +61 2 9850 6773 | F: +61 2 9850 8892 | E: jp.deranty at mq.edu.au Staff page Editor, Critical Horizons Qui s'est abaiss? devant la fourmi n'a plus ? s'abaisser devant le lion [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/gLKYCzvOWKiQ0n8LCXzOs6?domain=ci6.googleusercontent.com] CRICOS Provider Number 00002J. Think before you print. Please consider the environment before printing this email. This message is intended for the addressee named and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete it and notify the sender. Views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender, and are not necessarily the views of Macquarie University. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 790 bytes Desc: image001.jpg URL: