From debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au Tue Feb 26 10:31:31 2019 From: debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au (Debbie Castle) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:31:31 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] HPS Research Seminar - Paul Griffiths 4th March Message-ID: [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/mGy0CVAGXPtnJoGOIGLFav?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] SCHOOL OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Held in conjunction with the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science SEMESTER ONE 2019 RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES MONDAY 4th MARCH 2019 [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/cGzzCWLJY7iLEmJlhxmOwS?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] PROFESSOR PAUL GRIFFITHS Professorial Research Fellow Associate Academic Director (Arts and Social Sciences), Charles Perkins Centre UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY The Normal and the Pathological Revisited. The dominant view amongst philosophers of medicine is that biological facts are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine whether a phenotype is pathological. Once it has been determined by social facts that a phenotype is a pathological, biomedical science can reveal many facts about that phenotype, but biomedical science cannot reveal that it is a pathology. Given the right social facts, any phenotype could be either pathological or normal. While the internal dialectic in the philosophy of medicine that has led to this position is compelling, from the perspective of the broader biological sciences this is a puzzle. A distinction between the normal and the pathological seems implicit in straightforwardly scientific questions, such as distinguishing parasitic from commensal relationships between species, or regarding pathology as an alternative to the hypothesis that intra-specific variation is maintained by selection. I argue that discussion of the distinction between the normal and the pathological has been too focused on the human case and the context of clinical medicine. Whilst acknowledging the important insights about the distinction offered by philosophers of medicine, starting with Canguilhem, it is time to acknowledge that the distinction between is part of what Canguilhem?s contemporaries would have called a ?theory of the organism? and to integrate the philosophy of medicine with the philosophy of biology. WHERE: LEVEL 5 FUNCTION ROOM F23 (NEW) ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AT THE ENTRANCE TO CITY ROAD CAMPERDOWN CAMPUS WHEN: MONDAY 4TH MARCH START: 5.30PM All Welcome | No Booking Required | Free Copyright ? *2016* *Unit for HPS, All rights reserved. Want to change how you receive these emails? You can update your preferences or unsubscribe from this list This email was sent to debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au why did I get this? unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences Unit for History and Philosophy of Science ? University of Sydney ? Sydney, NSW 2006 ? Australia [Email Marketing Powered by Mailchimp] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue Feb 26 15:30:10 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 04:30:10 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Holly Lawford-Smith (Melbourne)*Please note change of time* @ Wed 27 Feb 2019 15:30 - 17:00 (AEDT) (Seminars) Message-ID: <00000000000038fecc0582c48327@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Holly Lawford-Smith (Melbourne)*Please note change of time* Title: Women-only spaces and the right to exclude Abstract: The ?right to exclude? is much-discussed in the political philosophy literature on immigration. Theorists argue that a nation has the right to self-determination, and that a significant part of self-determination is the freedom to associate (and to not associate) at will. Thus, it is up to nations whether and to what extend they admit would-be migrants. In pushing back against this claim, opponents tend to draw distinctions between groups of different kinds, from intimate associations like marriages, through expressive associations like religions, to political associations like nations. Intimate and expressive associations, they concede, may have the right to self-determination and so a right to exclude; but political associations do not. I draw on this discussion over immigration to assess two different claims made by gender critical feminists, first, that female people are entitled to female-only spaces (to the exclusion of all male people, regardless of gender identity), and second, that lesbians are entitled to lesbian-only spaces (to the exclusion of all male people, regardless of gender identity). I include under the broad category of ?spaces? both identity terms like ?woman?, ?female?, and ?lesbian?, and also categories like women?s sports and women-only shortlists. The right to exclude premised upon national self-determination is undermined by a difficulty in specifying what the ?self? in ?self-determination? is supposed to be, but this difficult does not cross over to the category of ?women? or the category of ?lesbian?, even though both terms are politically contested at present. I argue that for the same reasons some people think you cannot be racist against dominant racial groups, we should also think there is no problem in excluding members of dominant groups. Nations? right to exclude is at its most controversial precisely because of the vulnerability of would-be migrants (e.g. refugees, ecological migrants, and economic migrants). But transwomen are not made vulnerable by exclusion from female-only spaces, in particular when there are third spaces available. So the two cases are not parallel. Women, and lesbians, have the right to exclude. NB: Tea starts at 3pm When: Wed 27 Feb 2019 15:30 ? 17:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Luara Ferracioli- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/x5rRC81Zj6t53EoRUny-4t?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/CDhaC91ZkQtWnDGBUEvHFW?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/CDhaC91ZkQtWnDGBUEvHFW?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/nXU-C0YZWVFXvp13C2tsOU?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From hps.admin at sydney.edu.au Wed Feb 27 09:49:32 2019 From: hps.admin at sydney.edu.au (HPS Admin) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 22:49:32 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Updated - HPS Research Seminar - Paul Griffiths 4th March 2019 Message-ID: [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/rZEOCVAGXPtnA1lrtGR7_r?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] SCHOOL OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Held in conjunction with the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science SEMESTER ONE 2019 RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES MONDAY 4th MARCH 2019 [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/xZGyCWLJY7iLBvj7TxF-mN?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] PROFESSOR PAUL GRIFFITHS ARC Laureate Fellow, Professor of Philosophy and Domain Leader for Society and Environment, Charles Perkins Centre Arts and Social Sciences, School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY The Normal and the Pathological Revisited. The dominant view amongst philosophers of medicine is that biological facts are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine whether a phenotype is pathological. Once it has been determined by social facts that a phenotype is a pathological, biomedical science can reveal many facts about that phenotype, but biomedical science cannot reveal that it is a pathology. Given the right social facts, any phenotype could be either pathological or normal. While the internal dialectic in the philosophy of medicine that has led to this position is compelling, from the perspective of the broader biological sciences this is a puzzle. A distinction between the normal and the pathological seems implicit in straightforwardly scientific questions, such as distinguishing parasitic from commensal relationships between species, or regarding pathology as an alternative to the hypothesis that intra-specific variation is maintained by selection. I argue that discussion of the distinction between the normal and the pathological has been too focused on the human case and the context of clinical medicine. Whilst acknowledging the important insights about the distinction offered by philosophers of medicine, starting with Canguilhem, it is time to acknowledge that the distinction between is part of what Canguilhem?s contemporaries would have called a ?theory of the organism? and to integrate the philosophy of medicine with the philosophy of biology. WHERE: LEVEL 5 FUNCTION ROOM F23 (NEW) ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AT THE ENTRANCE TO CITY ROAD CAMPERDOWN CAMPUS WHEN: MONDAY 4TH MARCH START: 5.30PM All Welcome | No Booking Required | Free Copyright ? *2019* *School of HPS, All rights reserved. Want to change how you receive these emails? You can update your preferences or unsubscribe from this list This email was sent to debbie.castle at sydney.edu.au why did I get this? unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences Unit for History and Philosophy of Science ? University of Sydney ? Sydney, NSW 2006 ? Australia [Email Marketing Powered by Mailchimp] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu Feb 28 15:30:03 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 04:30:03 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Renee Jorgensen Bolinger (ANU) @ Wed 6 Mar 2019 15:30 - 17:00 (AEDT) (Seminars) Message-ID: <0000000000007dcfec0582ecbebb@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Renee Jorgensen Bolinger (ANU) Title: Contested Slurs and the Linguistic CommunityAbstract: Sometimes speakers within a linguistic community use a term that they do not conceptualize as a slur, but which other members of that community do. Sometimes these speakers are ignorant or na?ve, but not always. This paper explores a puzzle raised when some speakers stubbornly maintain that a contested term t is not derogatory. Because the semantic content of a term depends on the language, to say that their use of t is semantically derogatory despite their claims and intentions, we must individuate languages in a way that counts them as speaking our language L, allows t a determinately derogatory content in L, and still accommodates the other features of slurs? linguistic profile. Given the difficulty of doing this, there is some reason to give a non-semantic analysis of the derogatory aspect of slurs. Along the way, I suggest that rather than dismissing the stubborn as semantically incompetent, we would do better to appeal to expected uptake as moral reasons for the stubborn to adjust their linguistic practices.NB: Tea starts at 3pm When: Wed 6 Mar 2019 15:30 ? 17:00 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Where: Muniment Room, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Luara Ferracioli- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/hKiNCYWL1viWnr7VS0_Unt?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/1SxXCZYM2VFqkJ6KijfFxL?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/1SxXCZYM2VFqkJ6KijfFxL?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/BOGJC1WZXriAPV4JtpLNM1?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From john.sutton at mq.edu.au Thu Feb 28 17:54:37 2019 From: john.sutton at mq.edu.au (John Sutton) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 06:54:37 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Fw: Macquarie CogSci Seminar Series - Wednesday 6th March, 12-1pm, 3.610: Honorary Associate Professor Alex Woolgar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Philosophers interested in cognitive control, and/or current interpretations of neuroimaging data, may be interested in this talk next week. John ________________________________ From: Hannah Rapaport (HDR) on behalf of Department of Cognitive Science Seminars Sent: 28 February 2019 12:34 To: CogSci Everyone Subject: CogSci Seminar Series - Wednesday 6th March, 12-1pm, 3.610: Honorary Associate Professor Alex Woolgar Dear all, This coming Wednesday, we are delighted to be hosting Honorary Associate Professor Alex Woolgar (Cambridge University) to deliver a special CogSci seminar in celebration of Gender Equity Week at MQ and the upcoming International Women's Day. Alex will talk to us about the Brain Mechanism of Cognitive Control (see abstract below). Date: Wednesday 6th March Time: 12 - 1pm (pizzas will be provided following the seminar) Location: Marri Meeting Room (3.610), Level 3, Australian Hearing Hub Looking forward to seeing you all there, The CogSci Seminar Series Committee --- Seminar Abstract: The Brain Mechanisms of Cognitive Control At first glance, two great hallmarks of cognitive control appear to be in opposition. First, cognitive control must be selective: in a capacity limited system, processing of task-relevant information must be prioritised above the rest. Second, control must be flexible. After selectively attending to one set of information in one moment, we must be able to shift to a new set of information in the next, as we move through our task and mental focus changes. In this talk I will advance the proposal that these features are two sides of the same coin, arising from a single neural system that drives selective, yet flexible, processing of task relevant information. In particular, our programme of data from human functional imaging points to a specific system of frontal and parietal brain regions that flexibly emphasise different information according to the participant?s task. The next challenge for the field, however, is to understand how (and whether!) information coding gives rise to meaningful goal-directed behaviour. Key questions include: Is information that we decode in neuroimaging really the same code used by the brain? How is information exchanged and transformed between brain regions? And which of these effects are causal in determining cognition and behaviour? I will present recent work aiming to tackle these question using fMRI, MEG, and concurrent TMS-fMRI approaches. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au Thu Feb 28 20:12:44 2019 From: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au (Heikki Ikaheimo) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 09:12:44 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Erin Nash (UNSW): (Mis)information and Science-Informed Policymaking: The Probability Argument | UNSW Philosophy Seminar, 5 March 2019 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: [https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/1XXtCNLwM9iqgpLRfmEV3w?domain=gallery.mailchimp.com] (Mis)information and Science-Informed Policymaking: The Probability Argument Hosted by the School of Humanities & Languages (Philosophy) Abstract: In this paper I develop what I call the ?Probability Argument?, which highlights the consequences?in democratic societies?of non-experts having distorted perceptions of the probabilities that empirical hypotheses are correct. In contrast to both the ?deficit? and ?cultural cognition? models of science communication, my model accounts for a number of considerations that have been overlooked in the literature, such as the impact of the communication of misinformation, the place of higher-order evidence (i.e. evidence about putative experts, and the processes they have used to arrive at their first-order claims), and the role that intermediaries play in the communication of both first- and higher-order evidence. Bio: Dr Erin Nash is a postdoctoral fellow in the School of Humanities and Languages. Her PhD thesis (Durham University, UK) was in the emerging field of political epistemology, specificially looking at the political costs of misinformation about science circulating in our public knowledge systems. Her first degree is in science, and before returning to academia she had a policy-based career in government and non-government organisations in Australia, SE Asia, and Europe. She has also recently worked with political scientists and practitioners from the AAAS in the US on a NAS funded research project on effective and ethical science communication with policymakers. [A person smiling for the camera Description automatically generated] Speaker: Dr Erin Nash Event Details: Tuesday, 5 March 2019 12:30 ? 2:00 pm Goldstein, Room G07 Kensington Campus, UNSW No RSVP required. Map reference: B17 Contact: Heikki Ikaheimo e: h.ikaheimo at unsw.edu.au UNSW Arts & Social Sciences UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia arts.unsw.edu.au CRICOS Provider Code 00098G, ABN 57 195 873 179 [Facebook] [Twitter] [Linked In] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 31018 bytes Desc: image001.jpg URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: image006.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 5610 bytes Desc: image006.jpg URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Mar 1 15:00:06 2019 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 01 Mar 2019 04:00:06 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Alexandre Lefebvre @ Thu 7 Mar 2019 15:00 - 16:30 (AEDT) (Current Projects) Message-ID: <0000000000003c4287058300712a@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Alexandre Lefebvre Liberalism as a Way of Life: on the Spiriritual Exercises of John Rawls What would it mean for liberalism to be depicted as a self-standing way of life? Or, to use terms favoured by liberal political philosophers, what would it mean for liberalism be a depicted as its own comprehensive doctrine: not in the sense of being an offshoot of some other kind or worldview (whether religious or secular), but as itself an ethos and system of moral beliefs that encompasses the whole of one?s life and which needs no other source or support? In this talk, I argue that one version of liberalism ?as a way of life? can be found in John Rawls?s work, and more particularly, in what is basically the only under-explored area of his philosophy: the moral psychology developed in Part III of A Theory of Justice, along with a series of unpublished essays and lectures from his papers archived at Harvard University. My goal will be to sketch a liberal way of living that, while not for everyone, and very clearly not for use as a political or constitutional blueprint, is ambitious, attractive, and available for us today. When: Thu 7 Mar 2019 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Australia Time - Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/HLPiCq7BKYtg8j6XTZFQRY?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/w8FOCr8DLRty8l32czujx0?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/w8FOCr8DLRty8l32czujx0?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/R4XiCvl0PoCJ7z0AFz2M_Y?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: