From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Mon Oct 2 16:01:37 2017 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 05:01:37 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] JANE JOHNSON ACU seminar Friday Oct 6 2.30pm Message-ID: ACU Philosophy seminar: Dr. Jane Johnson (Macquarie University, University of Sydney) This week - Friday October 6, 2.30pm - 4 pm (AEDT) Taking dissent seriously: Appealing to animal researchers? For decades philosophers have formulated strong arguments in support of changing the practice of animal research intended to deliver clinical benefit to humans. Typically, however, these arguments have not been of a kind to motivate change on the part of those who work on the front-line of animal research. In this paper I argue that a new approach which focuses on the dissent of animals in research can appeal to researchers, since it furnishes good practical and epistemological reasons for practitioners to alter what they do. However, taking dissent seriously in this way can also support a radical rethinking of the ethics of animal research, which would likely be unpalatable to most researchers. Jane will speak from Sydney and the presentation will be video-conferenced to other campuses: Brisbane: Room TBA Strathfield: 600.1.02 VC (STR_xE2.45 Vd) Ballarat: 100.1.03 (BAL_xCB1.103 Vd) Canberra: 302.2.13 (CAN_xS.G.1.10 Vd) North Sydney: TWH.12.24 (Tenison Woods House, 8-20 Napier St. Nth Syd) Melbourne: 460.4.280 (Mel 4.28Vd) If you wish to attend the Sydney location and you are unsure of where to go, contact me directly and I will arrange to meet you along with Jane in the Foyer of Tenison Woods House (around 2.20pm) Steve Matthews (Stephen.matthews at acu.edu.au) ALL WELCOME! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sam.shpall at sydney.edu.au Tue Oct 3 09:56:41 2017 From: sam.shpall at sydney.edu.au (Samuel Shpall) Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 22:56:41 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] No seminar on Wednesday Message-ID: Hi all, Sadly we've had to cancel Albert Atkin's seminar on Wednesday. Hope to see many of you next week when the seminar series resumes. Cheers, Sam _ Sam Shpall Lecturer | Department of Philosophy | School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed Oct 4 15:00:08 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 04 Oct 2017 04:00:08 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Dominic Dimech @ Thu 5 Oct 2017 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a113bfdb4c263af055ab0a44a@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Dominic Dimech Title: Hume's 'Residual' Scepticism about Induction Abstract: Hume consciously reflects on the nature of scepticism in Treatise 1.4.7 (?Conclusion of this Book?) and Section 12 of his first Enquiry (?Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy?). I argue that we should read Hume as espousing a ?residual? form of scepticism in these sections. This means that Hume?s final, moderate sceptical position is a product of entertaining extreme sceptical worries but finding that they are impermanent. Recognition of this is important in its own right, as T 1.4.7 and EHU 12 are puzzling and central texts. But I also argue that this residual scepticism is informative for the debate over reading Hume on induction specifically. It turns out that the now popular approach of reading Hume as not an inductive sceptic is going to struggle accounting for Hume?s residual scepticism, because it cannot explain the relationship between his extreme doubts and his final position. When: Thu 5 Oct 2017 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: The Muniment Room, University of Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Jb1WBnU2GG7AFn?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Xq1VBlSYVV0oi6?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Xq1VBlSYVV0oi6?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/78eDB7UZnnowH0?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arts.cave at mq.edu.au Thu Oct 5 10:44:20 2017 From: arts.cave at mq.edu.au (Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics) Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 23:44:20 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] CAVE Seminar: Jeremy Moss (UNSW), "Historical Emissions and the Carbon Budget", 17 October, Macquarie Message-ID: Hi all, You are invited to the next Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics (CAVE) seminar, to be given by Prof. Jeremy Moss (Practical Justice Initiative, UNSW) on Tuesday 17 October. All welcome, no registration necessary. Jeremy Moss, "Historical Emissions and the Carbon Budget" Date: Tuesday 17 October Time: 13:00 - 14:00 Venue: W3A 501 (Blackshield room), Macquarie University (Q15 on campus map) Abstract: This paper assesses the role of fault-based distributive principles in dividing the world's remaining carbon budget. Many philosophers dismiss or downgrade the role of fault-based principles in the context of historical emissions because the original emitters are often dead, excusably ignorant or do not have the appropriate obligation generating links to their governments. While this view has some intuitive force, the paper argues that it and the associated focus on pre-1990 (pre IPCC report) emissions are now out of date. The paper argues that a restricted fault-based principle, according to which emissions should be divided among countries on the basis of their emissions since 1990, is both viable and powerful. The paper considers standard objections to a fault-based principle in this context, how such a principle might more concretely be applied, and its likely implications. About the speaker: Jeremy Moss is Professor of Political Philosophy and Co-Director of the Practical Justice Initiative at University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. His main research interests are in political philosophy and applied philosophy. Current research interests include projects on: climate justice, the ethics of renewable energy as well as the ethical issues associated with fossil fuel exports. Recent publications include: Reassessing Egalitarianism, Climate Change and Justice (Cambridge University Press), and ?The Morality of Divestment? in Law and Policy. All welcome! Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE) Department of Philosophy Macquarie University Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia CAVE website: mq.edu.au/cave www.facebook.com/MQCAVE -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michael.david.kirchhoff at gmail.com Thu Oct 5 12:29:44 2017 From: michael.david.kirchhoff at gmail.com (michael kirchhoff) Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 12:29:44 +1100 Subject: [SydPhil] UOW Philosophy Research Presents Dr. Caroline West (Sydney University) Message-ID: *UOW Philosophy Research Presents:* *Is there such a thing as happiness?* Speaker: Dr. Caroline West (Sydney University) Date: 11 October 2017 Time: 15.30-16.45 Venue: 19.2072 (Research Hub) Aimed at staff and postgraduates, but open to all. *Best wishes,* *Dr. Michael D. Kirchhoff * Lecturer in Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Enquiry Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts University of Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu Oct 5 13:00:01 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 05 Oct 2017 02:00:01 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Graham Oddie @ Wed 11 Oct 2017 13:00 - 14:00 (Seminars) Message-ID: <001a11431cfc0538de055ac31532@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Graham Oddie What is so good about being happy? Happiness and well-being have both played a rich role in the history of value theory and ethics. According to prominent versions of utilitarianism happiness and/or well-being is what we have a moral obligation to promote or even maximize. Despite the centrality of these concepts, there is no general consensus about what either happiness or well-being consist in, or exactly what the relationship between them is. I take my cue from a broadly Meinongian theory of emotions, as mental states that involve presentations of value. This theory yields a rather natural account of happiness and its relation to well-being. This yields an answer to the question that is the title of this talk. However, this answer may come as a surprise to some. It turns out that happiness is not an intrinsically good thing, and, even if consequentialism is correct, we have no obligation to pursue it or promote it, let alone to maximize it. When: Wed 11 Oct 2017 13:00 ? 14:00 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Sam Shpall- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/YZ5qB0unVg0JTO?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/K410BnU3dKVet9?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/K410BnU3dKVet9?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/e4MrBZUezOx3Fw?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From m.valaris at unsw.edu.au Thu Oct 5 13:19:35 2017 From: m.valaris at unsw.edu.au (Markos Valaris) Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 02:19:35 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Graham Oddie at UNSW, Tuesday 10 October Message-ID: The School of Humanities and Languages at UNSW invites everyone interested to the following presentation at the Philosophy seminar: Speaker: Graham Oddie (University of Colorado at Boulder) Title: Dust, ashes and the death of desire Abstract: According to one version of the evaluative theory of desire, desires are appearances of value. To desire P is for P to seem, or appear, good to one. A telling objection to the theory (urged recently by Federico Lauria) appeals to a popular doctrine that can be traced back to Socrates but also receives a strong endorsement in contemporary subjective decision theory: that when one comes to believe that the object of one's desire obtains, that desire dies. I argue for an understanding of desire on which this principle fails, although the theory explains both the scope and the limits of the doctrine. The theory also illuminates recent work on the difference between liking and wanting. Venue: MB 209 Date and Time: Tuesday 10 October, 12:30-2:00 Light lunch will be provided. Markos Valaris Senior Lecturer in Philosophy Associate Editor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy University of New South Wales Phone: +(61) 2 9385 2760 (office) Personal webpage: markosvalaris.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au Thu Oct 5 15:44:50 2017 From: philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au (PhilosophyatWesternSydney) Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 04:44:50 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] MA in Continental Philosophy, Western Sydney University, information sessions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear All, If you are interested in postgraduate studies in Continental philosophy, Western Sydney University runs an MA program, the only one solely in continental philosophy available in Australia: www.westernsydney.edu.au/philosophyMA If you want to find out more details about the program, there is a postgraduate information session next Thursday, October 12, from 6pm, at the Female Orphan School, Parramatta Campus. All welcome to attend. There will be refreshments and nibbles. Best, Dimitris - - - - - - - - - Dimitris Vardoulakis Western Sydney University School of Humanities and Communication Arts Bankstown Campus, 7.G.10 Locked Bag 1797 Penrith, NSW 2751 AUSTRALIA tel: +61 2 9772 6808 www.westernsydney.edu.au/philosophy -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Oct 6 14:59:54 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 06 Oct 2017 03:59:54 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Ryan Cox @ Thu 12 Oct 2017 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <94eb2c0571549c45b8055ad8df86@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Ryan Cox Title: Self-Knowledge and Made Up Minds Abstract: In this talk, I address the most pressing objection to the deliberative theory of self-knowledge: the made up minds objection. According to this objection, the deliberative theory cannot, on pain of manifest implausibility, give the same answer or similar answers to the following two questions: (i) How do I answer the question of whether I believe that P when my mind is already made up about whether to believe that P?; and (ii) How do I answer the question of whether I believe that P when my mind isn?t already made up about whether to believe that P? Since, according to the made up minds objection, any plausible theory of self-knowledge must give the same answer or similar answers to these questions, it follows that the deliberative theory is not a plausible theory. I argue that the made up minds objection fails, since no plausible theory of self-knowledge can give the same or similar answers to these questions. I then consider a follow-up objection put in terms of how I come to know whether I believe that P, rather than in terms of how I answer the question of whether I believe that P, and argue that this objection also fails, but for a different reason: the deliberative theory can give the same answer to both (i) the question of how I come to know whether I believe that P when my mind is already made up about whether to believe that P and (ii) the question of how I come to know whether I believe that P when my mind isn?t already made up about whether to believe that P. Indeed, I will suggest that it may well give the best answer to these questions. When: Thu 12 Oct 2017 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: The Muniment Room Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/38L3BqU3Ne2dIw?domain=google.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/q0YwBQfMV6XaTz?domain=google.com You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/q0YwBQfMV6XaTz?domain=google.com and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/44GqB7U8Eq2RfW?domain=support.google.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: