From Nikolas.Kompridis at acu.edu.au Mon May 22 08:05:38 2017 From: Nikolas.Kompridis at acu.edu.au (Nikolas Kompridis) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 22:05:38 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Varieties of Religious Pluralism Message-ID: Varieties of Religious Pluralism When: 22 May 2017, 4pm -6pm Where: Level 12, Tenison Woods House, 8-20 Napier Street, North Sydney Register here Professor Rajeev Bhargava, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and Institute for Social Justice One prevalent form of religious pluralism recognizes the existence of multiple religious communities, each doctrinally apart, rigidly bounded and well demarcated from the other, even demanding the exclusive allegiance of its members but, acknowledging ineradicable differences, endorses tolerance, even mutual respect. However, another, perhaps better form of religious pluralism exists that shuns doctrinalization, seeks more porous boundaries, advocates greater fluidity of movement, and accepts multiple allegiances. Here pluralism is internal to religious perspectives. In this lecture, Bhargava examines in detail the internal structure of these two forms of religious pluralism and ask what theological, social and political conditions must be met for the success and legitimacy of the second form of religious pluralism. For more details and events of the Sydney School for Critical Social Thought: http://isj.acu.edu.au/sydney-school/sydney-school-for-critical-social-thought-2017/ ???????????????????????????. Professor Nikolas Kompridis | Director | Institute for Social Justice Research Professor in Philosophy and Political Thought Office: Level 2, 7 Mount Street, North Sydney NSW 2060 Postal Address: PO Box 968, North Sydney, NSW 2059, Australia W http://isj.acu.edu.au/ P + 61 2 9739 2728 E nikolas.kompridis at acu.edu.au [ISJemailpicture] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 8D8C6D27-FCEF-490C-82EB-629756717E67[1].png Type: image/png Size: 23854 bytes Desc: 8D8C6D27-FCEF-490C-82EB-629756717E67[1].png URL: From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Mon May 22 10:27:20 2017 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 00:27:20 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Talia MORAG ACU Philosophy seminar series In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: ACU Philosophy seminar This week - Friday May 26, 2.30pm - 4 pm Talia will speak from ACU's Melbourne campus (video conferenced to other campuses - see below). Melbourne Campus (St Patrick's) Building 460 (250 Victoria Parade, East Melbourne VIC 3002)-Level 4-Room 4.280 Vid conference room Duck-Rabbit, Similar Faces, and the Imagistic ?Seeing-As?: A Non-Representational Alternative for the Case of Emotions The duck-rabbit example of seeing-as experiences, the drawing that can be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit, was made famous in Wittgenstein?s writings and influenced other areas of philosophy, such as the philosophy of emotion. The almost ubiquitous interpretation of this example is as follows: to see the duck-rabbit picture as a duck or as a rabbit, one requires the concept of a duck or of a rabbit. One sees the picture in terms of the concept ?duck? or ?rabbit.? What we may call the conceptualist seeing-as view is that ?aspect perception is concept-laden. Seeing something as an X presupposes mastery of the concept of an X.? (Severin Schroeder 2010). In this paper, I suggest there is a non-conceptualist way to understand seeing-as experiences, including the duck-rabbit, relying on imaginative capacities alone. The more obvious paradigm here is a less famous example of Wittgenstein?s, where two faces suddenly strike us as similar. In so far as we find the seeing-as model fruitful for accounts of mental states (emotions are my primary example), then those can then be understood as non-conceptual and non-representational states of mind. Bio: Dr. Talia Morag is postdoctoral fellow at Deakin University working on a project on implicit bias. Her main research interests are philosophical psychology, especially the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and the philosophical foundations of psychoanalysis, as well as philosophy of television. Recently her book Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason was published by Routledge (2016). She is the founding director of Psyche + Society, which considers social issues from a philosophical perspective enriched by psychoanalytic insights (www.psycheandsociety.com Talk will be video conferenced to other campuses: Brisbane: 200.2.03 (BRI_xAC.22 Vd) Strathfield: 600.1.02 VC (STR_xE2.45 Vd) North Sydney: 532.12.24 (NSY_xTWH.12.24 Vd) Ballarat: 100.1.03 (BAL_xCB1.103 Vd) Canberra: 302.G.03 (CAN_xS.G.1.10 Vd) Steve Matthews (Convenor) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sjd at cybersydney.com.au Mon May 22 11:15:50 2017 From: sjd at cybersydney.com.au (Sandra Jobson Darroch) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 11:15:50 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] blackheath philosophy forum Message-ID: <91d2b891-2647-f8e8-191d-2092ce9efd84@cybersydney.com.au> *BLACKHEATH PHILOSOPHY FORUM* *2017 SEASON* ** *5^TH TALK* *SATURDAY MAY 27, 4pm-6pm* Hall at the Blackheath Neighbourhood Centre, cnr. Gardiner Crescent & the Great Western Highway, Blackheath.** ** *?THE SUBLIME IN ETHICS AND AESTHETICS?* OUR SPEAKER WILL discuss how the sublime emerges as one of the core concepts of the developing tradition of aesthetics among British and German philosophers in the 18th century, focusing on how Kant - with a nod back to the Stoics, chiefly Seneca - argues for its centrality to human moral psychology and the development of character. Speaker:Melissa Merritt /Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of NSW/ ** *Come and join us for a stimulating talk and lively discussion*, 4pm-6pm, followed by informal discussion at the wine bar in Colliers Arcade. Admission $10 includes a big afternoon tea before question time. Hall is heated.All welcome!** For more program details please go to blackheathphilosophy.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From richard.menary at mq.edu.au Mon May 22 12:37:58 2017 From: richard.menary at mq.edu.au (Richard Menary) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 02:37:58 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Epistemic Angst and Extended Knowledge workshop at Macquarie 29/5/17 Message-ID: <6D690E0F-EC0F-4DD6-BE1C-3FD5BCE788F2@mq.edu.au> Dear All, The following workshop will take place at Macquarie University next week on Monday 29th.The keynote speaker will be Professor Duncan Pritchard (Edinburgh) who is also a visiting Research Professor in the department of philosophy at Macquarie University. Duncan will give a talk based upon upon his most recent book: Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Princeton). Attendance is free, but please contact kelly.hamilton at mq.edu.au for catering purposes. The venue room is 6.02 in building 75T. The building is located near the Macquarie hospital in section N, 27-8 on the campus map: http://www.mq.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/108142/Campus-Map.pdf The line up for the day is as follows: 9.00 - 9.25 Arrival 9.25 Introduction 9.30 - 11.00 Duncan (Edinburgh/MQ) Epistemic Angst ABSTRACT. Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal?viz., a two-pronged, integrated, undercutting treatment of both putative sceptical paradoxes. A particular biscopic proposal is then explored which brings together two apparently opposing anti-sceptical theses: the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation and epistemological disjunctivism. It is argued that each proposal enables us to gain a purchase on one, but only one, aspect of the two-sided sceptical problem. Furthermore, it is argued that these proposals are not only compatible positions, but also mutually supporting and advanced in the same undercutting spirit. A potential cure is thus offered for epistemic angst. 11.00 - 11.30 Coffee 11.30 - 12.30 Stephen Hetherington (UNSW) Relevant alternatives and fallible knowledge 12.30 - 1.30 Lunch 1.30 - 2.30 Alex Gillett (MQ) Knowledge and understanding: the impact of GPS devices on wayfinding 2.30 - 3.30 Richard Heersmink (MQ) Distributed learning: Educating and assessing extended cognitive systems 3.30 - 4.00 Coffee 4.00 - 5.00 Albert Atkin (MQ) Facitivity, Presupposition and scepticism 5.00 - 5.10 Break 5.10 - 6.10 Jeanette Kennett (MQ) and Caitrin Donovan (USYD) Reliable and unreliable judgments about reasons With Best, Richard Dr. Richard Menary Associate Professor ARC Future Fellow Macquarie University Department of Philosophy ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics Google Scholar Page academia.edu site Phil Papers Profile Books: Cognitive Integration Palgrave Macmillan and Amazon The Extended Mind (ed.) MIT Press -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue May 23 13:00:08 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 03:00:08 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Declan Smithies @ Wed 24 May 2017 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <001a1146e52a74da570550282fe2@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Declan Smithies Affective Experience, Reasons for Action, and Desire What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that these affective experiences ? feelings of attraction and aversion ? provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons for action only because they are dispositions to have affective experiences. On this account, affective experience has a central role to play in explaining how desires provide reasons for action. When: Wed 24 May 2017 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Sam Shpall- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=N3AwcXFyZDh0bWs4cWJib2phbWM0ZDA1NDggMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Tue May 23 16:04:22 2017 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 06:04:22 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] ACU Philosophy seminar this Friday: correction Message-ID: ACU Philosophy seminar This week - Friday May 26, 2.30pm - 4 pm Correction from previous announcement: Talia will speak from ACU's North Sydney campus: 8-20 Napier street (Tenison Woods House). Level 12, room 24 (videoconference room) Duck-Rabbit, Similar Faces, and the Imagistic ?Seeing-As?: A Non-Representational Alternative for the Case of Emotions The duck-rabbit example of seeing-as experiences, the drawing that can be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit, was made famous in Wittgenstein?s writings and influenced other areas of philosophy, such as the philosophy of emotion. The almost ubiquitous interpretation of this example is as follows: to see the duck-rabbit picture as a duck or as a rabbit, one requires the concept of a duck or of a rabbit. One sees the picture in terms of the concept ?duck? or ?rabbit.? What we may call the conceptualist seeing-as view is that ?aspect perception is concept-laden. Seeing something as an X presupposes mastery of the concept of an X.? (Severin Schroeder 2010). In this paper, I suggest there is a non-conceptualist way to understand seeing-as experiences, including the duck-rabbit, relying on imaginative capacities alone. The more obvious paradigm here is a less famous example of Wittgenstein?s, where two faces suddenly strike us as similar. In so far as we find the seeing-as model fruitful for accounts of mental states (emotions are my primary example), then those can then be understood as non-conceptual and non-representational states of mind. Talk will be video conferenced to other campuses: Brisbane: 200.2.03 (BRI_xAC.22 Vd) Strathfield: 600.1.02 VC (STR_xE2.45 Vd) Ballarat: 100.1.03 (BAL_xCB1.103 Vd) Canberra: 302.G.03 (CAN_xS.G.1.10 Vd) Melbourne: 460.4.280 (Mel 4.28Vd) If you wish to attend North Sydney feel free to email the convenor for directions. Steve Matthews (Convenor) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Wed May 24 11:51:44 2017 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 01:51:44 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Talia Morag Presentation CANCELLED Message-ID: ACU Philosophy seminar cancelled. Due to illness, Talia Morag's presentation which was to be this Friday has been cancelled. We have re-scheduled for August 25. Steve Matthews (Convenor) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed May 24 15:00:12 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 05:00:12 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Nao Kajimoto @ Thu 25 May 2017 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a1147fedaaee9a405503dfad8@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Nao Kajimoto When: Thu 25 May 2017 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzhvcTNlZ2E0NmdyM2ViOWk3NTFqMGI5azhwMmo2YjlwNzRzMzhiYTM2b3BrY2QxbjY0cmo2Y2hvNmcgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From adam.hochman at mq.edu.au Thu May 25 09:56:00 2017 From: adam.hochman at mq.edu.au (Adam Hochman) Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 23:56:00 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] MQ Philosophy Seminar on Tuesday the 30th of May: Duncan Pritchard (Edinburgh/MQ) Message-ID: Risk Duncan Pritchard (Edinburgh/MQ) Date: Tuesday, 30th of May Time: 13:00 - 14:30 Venue: W6A 708, Macquarie University All welcome Please note that the seminar will run to 2:30pm this week Abstract: It is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Four applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti-luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions, and can also (relatedly) cast light on the notion of legal evidence. Third, to the notion of aesthetic risk, and how more generally we can better account for how risk seems to add value to certain activities by appealing to the modal account of luck. Finally, fourth, some tentative remarks are offered on how the modal account of risk might be relevant to the good life of human flourishing. Contact: Adam Hochman (adam.hochman at mq.edu.au) or Mike Olson (michael.olson at mq.edu.au) A google calendar with details of other events in this series is available for viewing and subscription by following this link: goo.gl/3Iu7hk -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu May 25 13:00:05 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 03:00:05 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Sarah Sorial @ Wed 31 May 2017 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <94eb2c031e28f389820550506a14@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Sarah Sorial The expression of anger in the public sphere What role, if any, does the expression of anger play in public deliberations or public life? In what circumstances is the expression of anger appropriate, if at all, and what does it achieve? Expressions of anger are abundant in public discourse and deliberation. Often, they are in response to some legitimate injustice that has occurred. Yet some expressions of anger seem appropriate, while others do not, even in response to the same event. In this paper, I defend three main claims: first, that expressions of anger can function as a kind of performance in the public sphere; second, that these performances may have an important, albeit, very limited role to play in public deliberations. Third, that expressions of anger should be constrained by two important conditions: first, expressions of anger should carefully and accurately identify the source of the injustice in order to avoid the misattribution of blame for the wrongdoing. Second while it may be justifiable to express anger to communicate that an injustice has occurred, speakers should not advocate for violent retribution in how that wrongdoing is rectified. When: Wed 31 May 2017 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Sam Shpall- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=ajA0MHZkMnU4OWozYjdwaGx1M3NzZjZlYmMgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From glenn.rj.carruthers at gmail.com Fri May 26 09:20:03 2017 From: glenn.rj.carruthers at gmail.com (Glenn Carruthers) Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 09:20:03 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Fwd: Science of the self: The agency and body representation research forum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Potentially of interest best Glenn ============================================================ *Science of the self: The agency and body representation research forum* *20th ? 22nd November, 2017* *Coogee Beach, Sydney, Australia* *www.scienceofselfconference.org* ============================================================ *Confirmed presenters:* Dr Fr?d?rique de Vignemont Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris NYU/Paris Professor Matthew Longo Birkbeck, University of London Professor Jakob Howhy Monash University Dr Melita Giummarra Monash University Dr Colin Klein Macquarie University Dr Devin Terhune Goldsmiths, University of London PLUS MORE TO BE ANNOUNCED Agency and body representation are growing areas of interest in cognitive science. As a field we are trying to answer important questions about how we perceive our own bodies and represent our ability to causally manipulate the world. This research touches on a wide range of topics including action planning, sensory prediction, multisensory perception, time perception, expertise, and the social contexts of actions. This work contributes to our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that underlie self-representations, and highlights new possibilities for identification and remediation of disturbances to the sense of self often found in clinical disorders. Agency and body representation research also has important practical implications for informing technologies such as human-computer interfaces and virtual reality. Research in this area is diverse, and agency and body representation are often studied relatively separately. Despite broad relevance for a number of research areas in the cognitive sciences, there have been few opportunities for a focused gathering of investigators in these fields. This workshop aims to change that by providing a forum for international researchers across a range of disciplines to come together to discuss the intersection of agency and body representation research. In addition to traditional conference activities, such as talks and poster presentations, this workshop will also provide skill sharing opportunities for participants to learn the latest developments in research methodologies and theory. It is our hope that this event will provide a forum for new connections and collaborations amongst agency and body representation researchers to emerge. This workshop being sponsored by the ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, the Centre of Agency, Values and Ethics, and the Faculty of Human Sciences at Macquarie University in Sydney Australia. The first two days (20-21 November) will be held at Coogee Beach. A third day, focused on developing new collaborations and understanding current methodologies, will be held at Macquarie University (22 November). *The workshop will include:* *- Keynote presentations from world leading researchers. - Talks and poster presentations on recent discoveries, models and new methods.* *- Collaborative sessions and panels on methodologies and techniques such as neuroimaging, behavioural paradigms, explicit and implicit measures, and experiment design.* *- Facilitated opportunities to explore potential new collaborations.* *- An idyllic beachside setting.* *- Reduced rates for students and unfunded researchers.* *About the location:* The Coogee Bay Hotel is located right on one of Sydney?s finest beaches. Situated 20 minutes from the city centre, the beach features a magnificent coastal walk and protected marine reserve with excellent surfing, snorkelling and scuba diving. November is perfect time for a beach holiday in Sydney. There will be outdoor social activities and time to explore the beach and nearby nature before and after the conference each day. For more information, and to sign up for program and registration announcements please visit *www.scienceofselfconference.org* On behalf of the organising committee: Vince Polito Regine Zopf Simmy Poonian Mariia Kaliuzhna James Moore *Dr Regine Zopf* ARC DECRA Research Fellow Perception in Action Research Centre (PARC) ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD) Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University *T:* +61 2 9850 2956 <(02)%209850%202956> -- ========== Glenn Carruthers School of Psychology Charles Sturt University glenn.rj.carruthers at gmail.com gcarruthers at csu.edu.au 'Till all are one -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: pastedImage.png Type: image/png Size: 404670 bytes Desc: not available URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri May 26 14:59:57 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 04:59:57 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Luke Barnes @ Thu 1 Jun 2017 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a1137c8ee7b1f530550663573@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Luke Barnes Title: Fine-Tuning and probability Abstract: My work as a cosmologist has touched on an interesting philosophical problem, on that has been discussed in the philosophical literature. Fine-tuning in physics and cosmology is often used as evidence that a theory is incomplete. Of particular interest is the fine-tuning of the universe for life, which suggests that our universe?s ability to create physical life forms is improbable and in need of explanation by, perhaps, a multiverse. This claim has been challenged on the grounds that the relevant probability measure cannot be justified because it cannot be normalized, and so small probabilities cannot be inferred. I will discuss how fine-tuning can be formulated within the context of Bayesian theory testing (or model selection) in the physical sciences, and how normalizability problems might be avoided. When: Thu 1 Jun 2017 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=Xzg1MGphaDFuNjhyajZiYTY2MTBrNmI5azhjcWppYjlvNzBwa2FiOW82MG80NGNobjhvc2phZDltNjggZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: