From calendar-notification at google.com Tue Mar 21 13:00:10 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 02:00:10 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Hallie Liberto @ Wed 22 Mar 2017 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <94eb2c0eee68fc5344054b3400ca@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Hallie Liberto Rape, Self-Defense, and Epistemic Responsibility In this paper I will investigate our epistemic responsibility for taking measures that ensure, or improve the accuracy of our beliefs in two high-stakes contexts. First, I will argue that Donald Hubin and Karen Healey are correct that the ?Reasonable Man? standards for determining mens rea in cases of rape should be replaced by standards regarding: what is it reasonable for the state to expect of a person? Second, I will explain why a parallel move is sensible in cases of self-defense. Third, I will explain that Hubin and Healey?s approach is not appropriate for determining matters of consent in sexual coercion cases, nor is it appropriate for determining rights-forfeiture in cases of self-defense. These disparities, I argue, are due to the link between epistemic responsibility and stakes. When: Wed 22 Mar 2017 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Sam Shpall- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=aGJ1dDFvczZxbDNnZzc1bXZkczBub2MwdjQgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed Mar 22 15:00:08 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 04:00:08 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Nick Smith @ Thu 23 Mar 2017 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <94eb2c08d810dd5a20054b49cba1@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Nick Smith Problems of Precision in Bayesian Epistemology and Fuzzy Theories of Vagueness A common objection to theories of vagueness based on fuzzy logics centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of truth -- a real number between 0 and 1 -- to each vague statement is excessively precise. A common objection to Bayesian epistemology centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of belief -- a real number between 0 and 1 -- to each proposition is excessively precise. In this talk I explore possible parallels between these objections. In particular I argue that the only good argument along these lines against fuzzy theories of vagueness does not translate into a good argument against Bayesian epistemology. When: Thu 23 Mar 2017 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=Xzg0cTMyaGhsNzRvamViOW82NHJqZWI5azg4cjMyYjlvNmdwMzZiOWo2MTMzYWNwajhrcGo2ZzloOGcgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu Mar 23 13:00:09 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 02:00:09 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Karyn Lai @ Wed 29 Mar 2017 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <94eb2c1107789b9fd8054b5c3c86@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Karyn Lai Moral Philosophy and Confucius? Analects I consider a fundamental question in Confucian scholarship: how do we understand ethics in Confucius? Analects? Immanuel Kant commented that ?Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient...Their teacher Confucius teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine designed for the princes...and offers examples of former Chinese princes...But a concept of virtue and morality never entered the heads of the Chinese. In order to arrive at an idea...of the good [certain] studies would be required, of which [the Chinese] know nothing? (Helmuth von Glasenapp, Kant und die Religionen des Osten, Kitzingen-Main: Holzner verlag, 1954, pp. 105-106, trans. Julia Ching in ?Chinese Ethics and Kant,? Philosophy East and West 28.2: 161-172). More recently, comparative philosophers have presented Confucian ethics through the prism of ethical frameworks in Western philosophy including, for example, consequentialist or virtue ethics. I suggest a novel way of reading the Analects: that Confucius? words should be read non-prescriptively, which has the effect of liberating modern readers from their normative grip. Importantly, this approach to the ancient Chinese text paves the way for a more fruitful engagement with it, allowing us to use it to enhance our own moral learning. When: Wed 29 Mar 2017 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Sam Shpall- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NmE5cWg5azNxa29hbGhqODM2ZXF2bDA5ZGMgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dominic.murphy at sydney.edu.au Thu Mar 23 13:33:40 2017 From: dominic.murphy at sydney.edu.au (Dominic Murphy) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 02:33:40 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] =?windows-1252?q?HPS_Research_Seminar_-_Huw_Price=2C=A0?= =?windows-1252?q?_=27Heart_of_DARCness=27_27_March?= Message-ID: [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/377ed99b00666e1febb7dbbc0/images/4fed6c6d-233b-48a1-a3f9-8d84bd306ae5.jpg] THE UNIT FOR HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Held in conjunction with the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science SEMESTER ONE RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES MONDAY 27th MARCH 2017 [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/377ed99b00666e1febb7dbbc0/images/04c05e51-ac96-44e4-b8ba-a14b818b5a78.jpg] HUW PRICE Bertrand Russell Professor of Philosophy Academic Director, CSER & CFI University of Cambridge 'Heart of DARCness' Huw Price and Yang Liu There is a long-standing debate about whether an agent can hold a meaningful credence that she will perform some action, as she deliberates about whether to do so. No, say some authors, for Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction. Alan H?jek has recently criticised this thesis, claiming that it requires implausible 'credal gaps'. H?jek also surveys a range of arguments for the view, but finds them all wanting. We argue that H?jek's concern about credal gaps is misplaced ? there are gaps, but of a benign variety, easily seen to be needed for more general reasons. And we offer what we believe to be a new argument for the thesis in question, though one that is closely related to arguments about which H?jek is particularly dismissive. Again, our argument proposes that the thesis is a corollary of more general considerations, well developed elsewhere ? in particular, of the so-called ?transparency' of first-person present-tensed reflection on certain of one's own mental states. WHERE: CCANESA MEETING ROOM, MADSEN BUILDING CAMPERDOWN CAMPUS Best access to CCANESA is from the Eastern Avenue entrance of the Madsen Building. When you enter you will be on the 3rd floor. Please proceed across the foyer and take the stairs on the right up one floor. The door to CCANESA will be straight ahead on this landing WHEN: Monday 27th March 2017 START: 5.30PM All Welcome | No Booking Required | Free PLEASE CHECK OUR WEBSITE FOR ANY CHANGES TO VENUE OR TIME sydney.edu.au/science/hps/ Copyright ? *2016* *Unit for HPS, All rights reserved. Want to change how you receive these emails? You can update your preferences or unsubscribe from this list This email was sent to dominic.murphy at sydney.edu.au why did I get this? unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences Unit for History and Philosophy of Science ? University of Sydney ? Sydney, NSW 2006 ? Australia [Email Marketing Powered by MailChimp] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Thu Mar 23 17:30:36 2017 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 17:30:36 +1100 Subject: [SydPhil] Current Projects: Michael Duncan On Composite Objects and Their Properties Message-ID: Next Thursday?s curent projects seminar (3.00 in the Muniment room) will be Michael Duncan who will be presenting: Title: On Composite Objects and Their Properties The orthodox view of composition has it that composite objects are numerically distinct from the objects that compose them, taken together or separately. The rival view ? composition as identity ? says that composite objects are numerically identical to the objects that compose them, taken together. Thus, a chair is, on this view, identical to some atoms arranged in the shape of a chair. I will argue that accepting the orthodox view is more costly than it may initially seem. Unlike composition as identity, it requires giving up on a natural and seemingly widely held view about what I will call ?heterogeneous properties?: properties like being black and white, and being polka-dotted. Furthermore, all of the known alternatives to that view face serious difficulties. All are welcome, to hope to see you all there. Associate Professor Kristie Miller Senior ARC Research Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room S212, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Mar 24 15:00:01 2017 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 04:00:01 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Michael Duncan @ Thu 30 Mar 2017 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a113dba9c1f888f054b7207ed@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Michael Duncan Title: On Composite Objects and Their Properties The orthodox view of composition has it that composite objects are numerically distinct from the objects that compose them, taken together or separately. The rival view ? composition as identity ? says that composite objects are numerically identical to the objects that compose them, taken together. Thus, a chair is, on this view, identical to some atoms arranged in the shape of a chair. I will argue that accepting the orthodox view is more costly than it may initially seem. Unlike composition as identity, it requires giving up on a natural and seemingly widely held view about what I will call ?heterogeneous properties?: properties like being black and white, and being polka-dotted. Furthermore, all of the known alternatives to that view face serious difficulties. When: Thu 30 Mar 2017 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzZncmo4ZTluODhvazJiYTI2OTEzZ2I5azYwcjNlYjlvNzEyajBiOWc4NTEzZWQyMjZncjM2ZzltODggZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From adam.hochman at mq.edu.au Fri Mar 24 16:21:26 2017 From: adam.hochman at mq.edu.au (Adam Hochman) Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 05:21:26 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] MQ Philosophy Seminar on Tuesday the 28th of March: Pierrick Bourrat (MQ) Message-ID: Explaining Drift from a Deterministic Setting Pierrick Bourrat (MQ) Date: Tuesday, 28th of March Time: 13:00 - 14:00 Venue: W6A 708, Macquarie University ABSTRACT: Drift is often characterized in statistical terms. Yet such a purely statistical characterization is ambiguous for it can accept multiple physical interpretations. Because of this ambiguity it is important to distinguish what sorts of processes can lead to this statistical phenomenon. After presenting a physical interpretation of drift originating from the most popular interpretation of ?tness, namely the propensity interpretation, I propose a different one starting from an analysis of the concept of drift made by Godfrey-Smith. Further on, I show how my interpretation relates to previous attempts to make sense of the notion of expected value in deterministic setups. The upshot of my analysis is a physical conception of drift that is compatible with both a deterministic and indeterministic world. Contact: Adam Hochman (adam.hochman at mq.edu.au) or Mike Olson (michael.olson at mq.edu.au) A google calendar with details of other events in this series is available for viewing and subscription by following this link: goo.gl/3Iu7hk --- Adam Hochman Lecturer in Philosophy & Macquarie University Research Fellow Department of Philosophy | W6A, Room 733 Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia Staff Profile | http://www.mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/department_of_philosophy/staff/adam_hochman/ Academia.edu Page | https://mq.academia.edu/AdamHochman Philpapers Page | http://philpapers.org/profile/48626 Personal Website | adamhochman.com T: +61 2 9850 8859 | arts.mq.edu.au [Macquarie University] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: