From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Mon Aug 8 11:45:18 2016 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 01:45:18 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] JEANETTE KENNETT ACU Philosophy Seminar Series Message-ID: ACU Philosophy Seminar Series Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie University The cost of conscience: Kant on Conscience and Objection The spread of demands by doctors and allied health professionals for accommodation of their private ethical, usually religiously based, objections to providing care of a particular type, or to a particular class of persons, suggests the need for a re-evaluation of conscientious objection in health care and how it should be regulated. I argue on Kantian grounds that respect for conscience and protection of freedom of conscience is consistent with fairly stringent limitations and regulations governing refusal of service in healthcare settings. Respect for conscience does not entail that refusal of service should be cost free to the objector. I suggest that conscientious objection in medicine should be conceptualized and treated analogously to civil disobedience. . WHEN: Friday August 12, 2.30 PM - 4.00 PM WHERE: Jeanette will be speaking from North Sydney in room 24 located on the sixteenth floor of the ACU building, Tenison Woods House, 8 Napier Street North Sydney. If you wish to attend in North Sydney and you're unsure of where to go, please contact the convenor, Steve. (Stephen.matthews at acu.edu.au) Talk will be videoconferenced to: BALLARAT - CB1.104 BRISBANE- TC.19 MELBOURNE - 1.69 (250 Vic Pde) STRATHFIELD -C2.31 Enquiries: Steve Matthews (stephen.matthews at acu.edu.au) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au Mon Aug 8 12:54:02 2016 From: philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au (PhilosophyatWesternSydney) Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 02:54:02 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] WSU Philosophy Seminar: Redding Message-ID: Philosophy at Western Sydney University Research Seminar Date and Time: Wednesday, 17 August, 2016. 3:30pm ? 5:00pm Location: Bankstown Campus, Building 3, Meeting Room 3.G.54 Paper Hegel?s actualist metaphysics as a framework for understanding his recognition-based account of Christianity Speaker Paul Redding [AppleMark] Abstract Despite the fact that Hegel?s theory of recognition is standardly discussed in relation to his social and political philosophy, the most developed account of recognition to be found in his Phenomenology of Spirit occurs in the discussion of a form of religious inter-subjectivity based on the dynamics of confession and forgiveness. In this paper I argue that the recognitive relation is at the heart of Hegel?s account of modern Christianity, the theology of which in turn has to be understood in relation to a metaphysical position that, while critical of the idea of any transcendent realm beyond the actual world, is also critical of Spinoza?s then popular naturalist and pantheist version of actuality. We might better understand Hegel?s alternative to Spinoza, I argue, by comparing his metaphysical account of modality to varieties of ?actualism? that have recently emerged in reaction to David Lewis?s doctrine of ?modal realism?. Thus to counter Spinoza?s necessitarianism, and yet avoid any realm beyond the actual, Hegel aligns with those critics of Lewis?s account of a plurality of ?possible worlds?. On this ?actualist? alternative to Lewis?s possibilism, possibilities should not be conceived as alternate ?worlds? that are like the actual world, but as unrealized properties of the actual world itself. But such possibilities are abstracta (for example, sets of consistent propositions), and locating them within the actual, I suggest, requires one to recognize other minds as the irreducible loci of such abstract entities. Understood in this way, Hegel?s fundamentally ?recognitive? understanding of mind (spirit) complements his ?this-worldly? metaphysics, and underpins his distinctive Trinitarian conception of the nature of modern Christianity. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 7991BE92-7A9C-4624-96F9-8F955A730AB6.png Type: image/png Size: 59246 bytes Desc: 7991BE92-7A9C-4624-96F9-8F955A730AB6.png URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue Aug 9 13:00:08 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2016 03:00:08 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Kathryn Tabb @ Wed 10 Aug 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <047d7b5dbb88fdfba705399abad3@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Kathryn Tabb Mad Persons and Fatal Errors: Locke?s Account of Personal Identity in Context Locke?s account of personal identity has been criticized for allowing that if a person does not remember an action, he or she will not be held accountable for it on the day of final judgment. Since personhood is dependent on consciousness, an event done by the same human being need not be done by the same person if he or she is not conscious of having committed the act. Moreover, Locke?s account seems to allow for another unintuitive result: if someone is conscious of having done an action he or she is responsible for it, even if its clear his or her organism could not actually have committed it. Locke?s apologists have attempted, via textual interpretation, to extricate the theory from these unappealing consequences. I argue instead that Locke?s chose to bite these bullets. Nonetheless, his theory of personal identity still offers an ethically substantive account of reward and punishment. Using the contrast class of the madman ? whose freedom is overtaken, in Locke?s view, by associated ideas ? I illustrate that for Locke when ideas are not annexed to the consciousness via active perception, they do not contribute to the constitution of the person. This is because personhood is meant to track those ideas for which we are responsible, that is, which we obtain through the labor of the understanding. Based on this framework I offer a reading of Locke?s infamous ?fatal errors? passage (Essay 2.27.13), showing that the apparent fallacy can be resolved once we recognize that Locke?s forensic notion of the person is intended to track our liability for our moral notions, which we must work to monitor and which can be mitigated by madness. When: Wed 10 Aug 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Sydney Uni, Muniment Room Calendar: Seminars Who: * Sam Shpall- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=ZzQyZzBnazFsb2VuZ3U2NWhmY2RuNzRzNjQgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dalia.nassar at gmail.com Wed Aug 10 10:47:44 2016 From: dalia.nassar at gmail.com (Dalia Nassar) Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2016 10:47:44 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Clinton Tolley (UCSD) on "The Place of Logic in the Schelling-Hegel Debate" (Sydney) Message-ID: *Workshop on Clinton Tolley?s paper 'The Place of Logic in the Schelling-Hegel Debate' with a response from Paul Redding.* The paper will be circulated a week in advance. Attendees are asked to read the paper *ahead* of the workshop, as the aim of the workshop is to work through and discuss the paper. Please email Dalia Nassar (dalia.nassar at sydney.edu.au ) to receive a copy of the paper. All welcome. Monday 22 August 12.30-2pm Muniment Room, Main Quadrangle University of Sydney -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed Aug 10 15:00:01 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2016 05:00:01 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Nick Enfield @ Thu 11 Aug 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <047d7bdc79ee920d350539b085b8@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Nick Enfield Nick Enfield (Linguistics) In his 1979 paper ?Scorekeeping in a Language Game?, David Lewis suggests that a presupposition can be introduced into a conversation simply by speaking as if that presupposition already held; thereby, it ?springs into existence?. His example: ?Even George could win? introduces the presupposition that George is not an objectively strong candidate. Crucially, Lewis adds, ?tacit acquiescence? is also needed if this strategy is to work. The alternative to tacit acquiescence and accommodation of a presupposition is to block it with a form of explicit correction or challenge. His example: ?Whadda ya mean ?even George???. I would like to discuss two points that relate to my current research interest in everyday accountability. The first is that if conversation is a form of joint action, as Margaret Gilbert and many others have suggested, then such challenges are evidence of this: they show one participant exercising their ?right to rebuke? the other for a perceived transgression. The second point is that we can examine this question empirically, with reference to recordings of conversation collected in linguistic field work: I will present some cases of the ?whaddya mean X?? strategy for consideration in light of Lewis?s discussion. When: Thu 11 Aug 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzhncGpnZ2EzNmtwM2liYTM2OTIzNGI5azZjc2pjYmExOGdzamNiOWo3NHI0OGNwbTY0cGppZDFpNm8gZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Wed Aug 10 18:30:03 2016 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2016 18:30:03 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Tomorrow: Nick Enfield: Scorekeeping in a Language Game @3.00 Message-ID: <4A6E30DE-D62C-4B17-8A36-D15B667D0115@yahoo.com> Dear all, Tomorrow?s current project seminar will be Nick Enfield presenting then following: In his 1979 paper ?Scorekeeping in a Language Game?, David Lewis suggests that a presupposition can be introduced into a conversation simply by speaking as if that presupposition already held; thereby, it ?springs into existence?. His example: ?Even George could win? introduces the presupposition that George is not an objectively strong candidate. Crucially, Lewis adds, ?tacit acquiescence? is also needed if this strategy is to work. The alternative to tacit acquiescence and accommodation of a presupposition is to block it with a form of explicit correction or challenge. His example: ?Whadda ya mean ?even George???. I would like to discuss two points that relate to my current research interest in everyday accountability. The first is that if conversation is a form of joint action, as Margaret Gilbert and many others have suggested, then such challenges are evidence of this: they show one participant exercising their ?right to rebuke? the other for a perceived transgression. The second point is that we can examine this question empirically, with reference to recordings of conversation collected in linguistic field work: I will present some cases of the ?whaddya mean X?? strategy for consideration in light of Lewis?s discussion. As usual, seminars are in the muniment room at 3.00. Associate Professor Kristie Miller Senior ARC Research Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu Aug 11 13:00:08 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2016 03:00:08 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Neil Sinhababu @ Wed 17 Aug 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <94eb2c04f974aab1000539c2f6a8@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Neil Sinhababu From Moral Twin Earth to Pleasure in Eden In Moral Twin Earth cases, humans meet aliens and disagree with them about moral questions. The causal theory of reference often used by naturalistic moral realists entails that such disagreement is impossible. This unwelcome result is avoided by combining an empathic theory of representation with an experientialist analysis of moral concepts on which they apply to whatever guilt, horror, and admiration objectively represent. This new semantic theory permits disagreement in Moral Twin Earth cases and entails ethical hedonism. When: Wed 17 Aug 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Sydney Uni, Muniment Room Calendar: Seminars Who: * Sam Shpall- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjE0NXEwZTNodGg5MHJiNTBzMm1qdXBzcmsgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Nikolas.Kompridis at acu.edu.au Fri Aug 12 05:52:25 2016 From: Nikolas.Kompridis at acu.edu.au (Nikolas Kompridis) Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2016 19:52:25 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Cynthia Willett - Affect Attunement: Discourse Ethics Across Species Message-ID: Affect Attunement: Discourse Ethics Across Species Professor Cynthia Willett, Emory University When: 16 August 2016, 1-3pm Where: Room 16 A, Level 16, Tenison Woods House - 8-20 Napier Street, North Sydney Donna Haraway calls for a cosmopolitical trans-species ethics. But then on what biosocial basis might we tap into communicative capacities in a world that we inhabit together with other species? This question is explored through preliminary clues from well-established research on the responsive, preverbal "proto-conversations" between human infants and adults. Social attunement, more powerfully than mirroring forms of empathy, explains the communication of affects within communities and across species, human and nonhuman. Cynthia Willett is a professor of philosophy at Emory University. Her books include Irony in the Age of Empire: Comic Perspectives on Freedom and Democracy; The Soul of Justice: Racial Hubris and Social Bonds; and Maternal Ethics and Other Slave Moralities. She has also edited the anthology Theorizing Multiculturalism and is a coeditor for the Symposia on Race, Gender, and Philosophy. Professor Nikolas Kompridis | Director | Institute for Social Justice Research Professor in Philosophy and Political Thought Office: Level 2, 7 Mount Street, North Sydney NSW 2060 Postal Address: PO Box 968, North Sydney, NSW 2059, Australia W http://isj.acu.edu.au/ P + 61 2 9739 2728 E nikolas.kompridis at acu.edu.au [ISJemailpicture] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: E4756EAC-A80B-4080-8BE0-38A490FF7C67.png Type: image/png Size: 23854 bytes Desc: E4756EAC-A80B-4080-8BE0-38A490FF7C67.png URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri Aug 12 15:00:02 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2016 05:00:02 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Jun Otsuka @ Thu 18 Aug 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <94eb2c0cbe324d57e20539d8c131@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Jun Otsuka Title: A model-theoretic approach to the species problem Jun Otsuka (Kobe University) In this talk I propose a novel approach to the species problem, which identifies a biological species as a model of a scientific theory. Various species concepts are then understood as models, defined as set-theoretic entities, for different theories, such as that of the first order predicate logic, linear algebra, probability theory, or the causal graph theory. The approach emphasizes that the species problem is not a metaphysical exercise or conceptual analysis, but rather is and should be grounded on our best theory of what the biological world is like. On this ground and the recent advance in the evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo), I support the causal concept of species, arguing that species are best understood as models of the causal graph theory. When: Thu 18 Aug 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzhncDM4Y3BnNzExNGFiYTY2dDFqY2I5azZwMms4YjlwNzRvM2liOW42MTE0MmgyNDZsMjQ0ZDFtNmcgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From adam.hochman at mq.edu.au Sat Aug 13 11:49:37 2016 From: adam.hochman at mq.edu.au (Adam Hochman) Date: Sat, 13 Aug 2016 01:49:37 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] MQ Philosophy Seminar on Tuesday 16th of August: Neil Sinhabubu (NUS) Message-ID: Experientialism About Moral Concepts Neil Sinhabubu (National University of Singapore) Date: Tuesday, 16th of August Time: 13:00 - 14:00 Venue: W6A 107, Macquarie University ABSTRACT: I present an experientialist account of moral concepts, on which moral judgments are beliefs about when moral feelings represent objective properties. For example, wrong actions are objectively represented by the feeling of guilt, while virtuous people are objectively represented by the feeling of admiration. This account fits into a cognitivist, externalist, and Humean picture of moral judgment. Within the framework of naturalistic moral realism, it provides new support for ethical hedonism. Contact: Adam Hochman (adam.hochman at mq.edu.au) or Mike Olson (michael.olson at mq.edu.au) A google calendar with details of other events in this series is available for viewing and subscription by following this link: https://goo.gl/56sotM --- Adam Hochman Macquarie University Research Fellow Department of Philosophy | W6A, Room 733 Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia Staff Profile | http://www.mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/department_of_philosophy/staff/adam_hochman/ Personal Website | adamhochman.com Academia.edu Page | https://mq.academia.edu/AdamHochman Philpapers Page | http://philpapers.org/profile/48626 T: +61 2 9850 8859 | arts.mq.edu.au [Macquarie University] -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: