From arts.cave at mq.edu.au Mon May 23 13:04:26 2016 From: arts.cave at mq.edu.au (Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 03:04:26 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] CAVE Seminar: Robert Audi (Notre Dame), Thursday 26 May, "Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification" at Macquarie University Message-ID: Hi all, The Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics (CAVE) is pleased to announce its next seminar, to be given by Robert Audi (Notre Dame). Title: Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification Date: Thursday 26 May (This week!) Time: 15:00 - 16:30 Venue: Building W6A 107, Macquarie University Abstract: Twentieth-century epistemology might be plausibly considered predominantly atomistic, focusing mainly on individual beliefs and instances of knowledge of specific propositions. Since at least the 1990s, however, we have seen progressively more theorizing in which the focus is holistic, with elements of intellectual character receiving intensive study and taken to clarify conditions under which individual beliefs are justified or constitute knowledge. This essay is primarily concerned with intellectual character. It assumes that knowledge and justification are importantly different concerns of epistemology and pursues the question whether we might fruitfully distinguish intellectual virtues in relation to the relative importance of these two elements in their constitution. It is argued that some intellectual virtues might be fruitfully considered knowledge-based, whereas others are plausibly viewed as justification-based and still others have a more complicated basis. The paper also explores the manifestations, as distinct from the basis, of intellectual traits. The result is an outline of an account of intellectual virtue and, in that light, a wider conception of intellectual character than the leading conceptions of it presented in recent epistemological literature. About the speaker: Robert Audi is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, and Professorial Fellow at Australian Catholic University. His major work focused on epistemology, ethics (especially ethical intuitionism), political philosophy, religious epistemology and the philosophy of mind and action. Some of his recent books include: Moral Perception (Princeton UP, 2013); Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State (Oxford UP, 2011); Rationality and Religious Commitment (Oxford UP, 2011); Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 3rd ed, 2010); Business Ethics and Ethical Business (Oxford UP, 2009); Moral Value and Human Diversity (Oxford UP, 2007); and The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton UP, 2004). Prof Audi has served as president of the American Philosophical Association (Central Division, 1987-1988) and is general editor of The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (3rd edition, 2015). All welcome, no registration required. Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE) Department of Philosophy Macquarie University Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia CAVE website: mq.edu.au/cave www.facebook.com/MQCAVE -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Mon May 23 14:24:22 2016 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 14:24:22 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] James Norton: Grounding: it's (probably) all in the head Thursday @ 3.00 Message-ID: <8910F89E-DBCB-40DA-896B-7D5DBD72150C@yahoo.com> This coming Current Projects seminar will be James Norton giving the following paper: Grounding: it's (probably) all in the head In this paper we provide a psychological explanation for ?grounding observations??observations that are thought to provide evidence that there exists a relation of ground. Our explanation does not appeal to the presence of any such relation. Instead, it appeals to certain evolved cognitive mechanisms, along with the traditional modal relations of supervenience, necessitation and entailment. As usual, papers are in the Muniment room on Thursday at 3.00. Associate Professor Kristie Miller Senior ARC Research Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Mon May 23 14:32:27 2016 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 04:32:27 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] GREG RESTALL ACU philosophy seminar series Message-ID: ACU Philosophy Seminar Series Proofs and what they're good for Abstract: I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in thought that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof. Prof. Greg Restall Professor of Philosophy School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne WHEN: Friday May 27, 2.30 PM - 4.00 PM WHERE: Greg will be speaking in Melbourne. St Patrick's Lv 1 Room 69, 250 Victoria Parade, East Melbourne (Note special venue due to renovations) Talks are videolinked to other campus sites: Strathfield, MSM VC Room (E2.45 Room) North Sydney, MacKillop Level 16 TWH Building (8-20 Napier Street N. Syd) Canberra, Signadou 110 Ballarat Aquinas 503. Brisbane, McAuley AC.22 Enquiries: Steve Matthews (stephen.matthews at acu.edu.au) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue May 24 13:00:03 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 03:00:03 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Anik Waldow (Sydney) @ Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <089e0116076ee5b3af05338dc0a5@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Anik Waldow (Sydney) Moral Reflection as Perception: A Humean Account In this paper I argue that, within Hume?s framework, it makes sense to think of conflicts between differing sympathetic sentiments as naturally causing us to take up a moral perspective. The aim of developing this causal reading of how our moral capacities are produced is to show that capacities that require for their formation an engagement with history, society and culture can still be deemed natural because of the causal process that underlies their formation. To recognise this connection between the natural and the artificial is important, not simply because it puts us in a position to see that Hume?s concept of human nature paves the way for a dynamic conception of human development that stands in stark contrast to any form of biological essentialism. It also revels that, for him, the naturalisation of the human being ultimately revolves around the attempt of providing causal explanations that render intelligible that which seems to be unnatural about our lives as social, moral and reflective creatures. When: Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=czY3ZG9pZWd1NjdrcTRjNWtsdm1rNzZhcGMgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au Wed May 25 06:53:04 2016 From: david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au (David Macarthur) Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 20:53:04 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] REMINDER: Robert Audi talk at USYD, Muniment Room (S401), 11am FRI May 27th Message-ID: Prof. Robert Audi (UNotre Dame, ACU) will be presenting a talk in the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney this coming Friday. Title: "Moral Perception: Causal, Ontological, and Epistemic Dimensions" Abstract: What is the difference between merely seeing an action that is wrong?something possible for any sighted animal?and having a moralperception of such an action, a phenomenologically distinctive perceptual response that a person with moral sensibility would likely have in seeing a violent act toward an innocent fleeing person? Such wrongs seem quite perceptible, but wrongness is not an ?observable? property like color or shape, nor is ?wrong? an observation term. This presentation will extend and defend the theory of moral perception set out in my Moral Perception (Princeton, 2013). I will show, using concrete examples, how such perception is possible, how it is like and unlike other kinds of perception, and how it can be a basis for moral knowledge. One element in the theory draws on an analogy between perception and action. Another element clarifies moral perception by comparison with the perception of emotion. The theory also takes into account the significance of the perceiver?s ?background beliefs? as elements potentially biasing moral perception, and it clarifies the sense in which perception can be responsive to complex information without being tacitly inferential. The talk should interest people concerned with ethics and value theory, with the philosophy and psychology of perception, or with the scope and basis of knowledge. Time: 11am Fri, May 27. Place: Muniment Room, S401, Main Quad (upstairs under the clock tower) All welcome! Assoc. Professor David Macarthur Philosophy Department, SOPHI | FASS The University of Sydney, NSW, 2006 | Australia http://sydney.edu.au/arts/philosophy/staff/profiles/david.macarthur.php -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From fiona.jenkins at anu.edu.au Wed May 25 17:53:46 2016 From: fiona.jenkins at anu.edu.au (Fiona Jenkins) Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 07:53:46 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Teaching Opportunity Message-ID: An opportunity has arisen to teach a philosophy course on Nietzsche at ANU in Semester 2 2016 (lectures and tutorials, over 13 weeks). Suitably qualified candidates (PhD or close to completing PhD in this or a closely related area) should contact Associate Professor Fiona Jenkins with a CV and expression of interest, Fiona.Jenkins at anu.edu.au. Evidence of teaching ability and names of two referees should be included in the CV. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Thu May 26 11:07:53 2016 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 01:07:53 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] GREG RESTALL ACU PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR SERIES Message-ID: ACU Philosophy Seminar Series Greg Restall Professor of Philosophy School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne Proofs and what they're good for Abstract: I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in thought that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof. WHEN: Friday May 27, 2.30 PM - 4.00 PM WHERE: Greg will be speaking in Melbourne. St Patrick's Lv 1 Room 69, 250 Victoria Parade, East Melbourne (Note special venue due to renovations.) Talks are videolinked to other campus sites: Strathfield, MSM VC Room (E2.45 Room) North Sydney, MacKillop Level 16 TWH Building (8-20 Napier Street N. Syd) Canberra, Signadou 110 Ballarat Aquinas 503. Brisbane, McAuley AC.22 Enquiries: Steve Matthews (stephen.matthews at acu.edu.au) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu May 26 13:00:15 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 03:00:15 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Monima Chadha (Monash) @ Wed 1 Jun 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <94eb2c05e7fa4d67cd0533b5fd9e@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Monima Chadha (Monash) No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership Abhidharma-Buddhist philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a ?self? in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. I argue for a strong reading of the no-self view as a variety of no-subject or no-ownership view. The Buddhists are not just denying the diachronically unified and extended self but also minimal selfhood insofar as it associated with a sense of ownership and agency.The view is deeply counterintuitive and the Buddhists are acutely aware of this fact. Accordingly, the Abhidharma-Buddhist writings and contemporary reconstructions of the view are replete with attempts to explain the phenomenology of experience in a no-self world. The paper defends the no-ownership view using resources from contemporary discussions about sense (or lack thereof) of ownership. When: Wed 1 Jun 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=ZmFpNjRqaGMzZXEzaTk2Zms3dGl0dHQyMTQgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From m.valaris at unsw.edu.au Thu May 26 16:03:39 2016 From: m.valaris at unsw.edu.au (Markos Valaris) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 06:03:39 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Reminder: Robert Audi at UNSW, 27 May Message-ID: Robert Audi will be giving a talk that the UNSW Philosophy Seminar on 27 May. The venue is Morven Brown 310, and the time 2:30 to 4:00. Title and abstract: Understanding, Justification, and Self-Evidence: Adequate Understanding as a Basis of A Priori Justification Self-evidence is widely taken to be a status that marks propositions as capable of being justifiedly believed (and known) on the basis of understanding. This paper explicates and defends that view. The paper shows that the broadly linguistic kind of understanding implied by semantic comprehension of a formulation of a self-evident proposition does not entail being justified in believing it; that the kind of understanding adequate to yield such justification is multi-dimensional; and that there are many variables partly constitutive of adequate understanding-all having philosophical interest in themselves-which contribute to the kind and degree of understanding that a theory of self-evidence must account for. The paper also shows why self-evident propositions need not be obvious, need not be unprovable, and, far from being beyond dispute, can be a subject of rational disagreement. The concluding section shows how knowledge of self-evident propositions is possible even if, on the one hand, they are abstract and causally inert and, on the other, beliefs constituting knowledge must meet both causal and reliability conditions connected with their truthmakers. Hope to see you there! Markos Valaris Lecturer in Philosophy Associate Editor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy University of New South Wales Phone: +(61) 2 9385 2760 (office) Personal webpage: markosvalaris.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From tsol9898 at uni.sydney.edu.au Thu May 26 22:01:57 2016 From: tsol9898 at uni.sydney.edu.au (Toby Solomon) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 22:01:57 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Fwd: CfP: APPC 2016 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: *Call for Papers: *Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference 2016 *Deadline for Abstracts and Travel Funding: 31st July* *Basics: *The Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference 2016 will be held at the Australian National University in Canberra from Saturday 24th to Monday 26th September 2016 (with an opening plenary address on Friday 23rd of September). *Talks: *We invite abstract submissions on any philosophical topic (200 words maximum) from all postgraduate students currently enrolled at an Australasian university. Sessions will generally be 1 hour in length (30 mins speaking, 30 mins question and answer). There may be opportunities for shorter and longer session depending on demand, your preference can be indicated when submitting an abstract. *Diversity: *The conference organisers are committed to supporting diversity in philosophy and particularly encourage submissions from underrepresented groups in philosophy. *Poster Presentations: *The conference will involve a time slot dedicated to the presentation of posters in an informal circulate and talk format. Any attendee is welcome to present a poster (printing will be available at the conference for A3 size posters) as long as it is not on the same topic as a talk they are giving. We believe this will provide an excellent opportunity for those presenting less standard work or wishing to develop ideas not yet ready for full paper or talk presentations. *Travel Funding: *There will be a limited amount of travel funding available to cover travel costs for postgraduate speakers with preference given based on total travel distance. Speakers from within NSW will only be eligible for funding in extenuating circumstances (ACT residents are not eligible). Allocation of funds will take into account other funding sources available to attendees. Applications for travel funding can be submitted with registration at the link below. *Registration: *Registration is free and open to all graduate students and upper level undergraduate students (3rd year and honours) who wish to attend. You can register and submit an abstract here: http://goo.gl/forms/nhFBcbTDyFfMEd882 *Workshops: *The conference will include several workshops on philosophical craft and professional development for graduate students. If you would be interested in running a workshop and have relevant expertise please contact us at 2016APPC at gmail.com for more information (faculty most welcome). *Website: *Please visit our website here: http://philosophy.anu.edu.au/event/australasian-postgraduate-philosophy-conference Or to register and submit an abstract go here: http://goo.gl/forms/nhFBcbTDyFfMEd882 *Contacts: *For workshop suggestions, comments and general enquiries please email 2016APPC at gmail.com On behalf of the organising committee, *Toby Solomon* Committee Chair -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From lddp at outlook.com Thu May 26 23:57:11 2016 From: lddp at outlook.com (=?utf-8?B?bGF1cmEgZGVzaXLDqGUgZGkgcGFvbG8=?=) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 13:57:11 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Workshop: When Cognition Becomes Social Message-ID: Dear All, with great pleasure I invite you to the workshop When Cognition Becomes Social organised by Primate Cognition Team and held at the LiKo (Lichtenberg-Kolleg), into the splendid historic observatory, the 17 June 2016, h. 9:00 am Invited speakers are: Julia Ostner and Oliver Sch?lkeDavid LeavensHannes RakoczyKristin Andrews More info and abstract: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/539509.html The number of available spots is REALLY limited, so if you like to attend please send an e-mail as soon as possible to: Turan.Lackschewitz at zvw.uni-goettingen.de For any other information, please feel free to contact me directly (please, use the mail in the signature). Regards, Laura D. Di Paolo? ______________________________Laura Desir?e Di Paolo, Ph.D. ?"?Lichtenberg-Kolleg?"? Institute for Advanced Study DPZ, Deutsche PrimatenZentrumLeibniz-ScienceCampus?Georg-August? ?Universit?t? -? G?ttingen, Germany Dept. Philosophy"Sapienza", University of Rome - Rome, Italy lauradesiree.dipaolo at gmail.comhttps://sites.google.com/site/lauradesireedipaolo/ https://uni-goettingen.academia.edu/LauraDesir%C3%A9eDiPaolo mob. +49 015 25 65 92 602 (de) +39 328 92 14 042 (ita)skype: laura.desiree.di.paolo------------ Evolution & Cognition (Research Group) http://evolutioncognition.wordpress.com evolutionandcognition at gmail.com_______________________________CallSend SMSCall from mobileAdd to SkypeYou'll need Skype CreditFree via Skype -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri May 27 15:00:10 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 05:00:10 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Alexander Grossman @ Thu 2 Jun 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a11c12e3c03b3ed0533cbc8b8@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Alexander Grossman Title: "Conciliationism and Debunking: A Response to Bogardus" Abstract: Proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments think that the facts of evolution suggest that if moral realism is true, our moral beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Tomas Bogardus has proposed the Argument from Symmetry, a specific evolutionary debunking argument motivated by conciliationism about peer disagreement, on which the rational response to a certain sort of disagreement is to give up the disputed belief. According to Bogardus, the Argument should worry proponents of 'Representationalism,' who believe that all of our moral beliefs are formed on the basis of a mental intermediary like sentiment or gut feeling. Supposedly well-positioned to respond to the Argument are proponents of 'Rationalism,' who believe that at least some of our moral beliefs are formed on the basis of a direct apprehension of the moral truth. Bogardus has identified a plausible way of spelling out the evolutionary threat to moral realism, but has misjudged its power: as I will argue, if the Argument succeeds against Representationalism then it succeeds against Rationalism. When: Thu 2 Jun 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzY4cWplY3E1NmtwamNiOW82Z3A0OGI5azhsMGppYjlwNm9zajRiYTE4OHAzMGMxajhsMjNjZGkzNjQgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sjd at cybersydney.com.au Sun May 29 13:41:53 2016 From: sjd at cybersydney.com.au (Sandra Darroch) Date: Sun, 29 May 2016 13:41:53 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] June 4 Blackheath Philosophy Forum Message-ID: <574A6501.9080208@cybersydney.com.au> *BLACKHEATH PHILOSOPHY FORUM* blackheathphilosophy.org ** 4pm Saturday June 4 ** *"Love and Meaning?* ** *Our speaker, Sam Shaoall*, *Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sydney, will discuss: ?*Perennial philosophical questions about love remain unresolved. Is love an emotion, a mode of willing, or a special kind of cognition? Is love under our control, and can we be evaluated for it? Is love rational, or merely an expression of arbitrary passions? Is love a moral virtue, or a more mixed blessing? I begin to sort through these difficult questions by offering an account of love that rejects the common idea that love for persons is distinct from love for other kinds of objects, and that distinguishes love from other psychological phenomena via its connection to the perception of meaning.? ** ** *Come and join us for a stimulating talk and lively discussion *at the Hall at the Blackheath Neighbourhood Centre, cnr Gardiner Crescent & the Great Western Highway, 4pm-6pm, followed by informal discussion at the pub.Admission $10 includes a big afternoon tea before question time. Hall is heated.All welcome!** For more program details please go to blackheathphilosophy.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arts.cave at mq.edu.au Mon May 23 13:04:26 2016 From: arts.cave at mq.edu.au (Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 03:04:26 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] CAVE Seminar: Robert Audi (Notre Dame), Thursday 26 May, "Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification" at Macquarie University Message-ID: Hi all, The Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics (CAVE) is pleased to announce its next seminar, to be given by Robert Audi (Notre Dame). Title: Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification Date: Thursday 26 May (This week!) Time: 15:00 - 16:30 Venue: Building W6A 107, Macquarie University Abstract: Twentieth-century epistemology might be plausibly considered predominantly atomistic, focusing mainly on individual beliefs and instances of knowledge of specific propositions. Since at least the 1990s, however, we have seen progressively more theorizing in which the focus is holistic, with elements of intellectual character receiving intensive study and taken to clarify conditions under which individual beliefs are justified or constitute knowledge. This essay is primarily concerned with intellectual character. It assumes that knowledge and justification are importantly different concerns of epistemology and pursues the question whether we might fruitfully distinguish intellectual virtues in relation to the relative importance of these two elements in their constitution. It is argued that some intellectual virtues might be fruitfully considered knowledge-based, whereas others are plausibly viewed as justification-based and still others have a more complicated basis. The paper also explores the manifestations, as distinct from the basis, of intellectual traits. The result is an outline of an account of intellectual virtue and, in that light, a wider conception of intellectual character than the leading conceptions of it presented in recent epistemological literature. About the speaker: Robert Audi is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, and Professorial Fellow at Australian Catholic University. His major work focused on epistemology, ethics (especially ethical intuitionism), political philosophy, religious epistemology and the philosophy of mind and action. Some of his recent books include: Moral Perception (Princeton UP, 2013); Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State (Oxford UP, 2011); Rationality and Religious Commitment (Oxford UP, 2011); Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 3rd ed, 2010); Business Ethics and Ethical Business (Oxford UP, 2009); Moral Value and Human Diversity (Oxford UP, 2007); and The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton UP, 2004). Prof Audi has served as president of the American Philosophical Association (Central Division, 1987-1988) and is general editor of The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (3rd edition, 2015). All welcome, no registration required. Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE) Department of Philosophy Macquarie University Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia CAVE website: mq.edu.au/cave www.facebook.com/MQCAVE -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Mon May 23 14:24:22 2016 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 14:24:22 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] James Norton: Grounding: it's (probably) all in the head Thursday @ 3.00 Message-ID: <8910F89E-DBCB-40DA-896B-7D5DBD72150C@yahoo.com> This coming Current Projects seminar will be James Norton giving the following paper: Grounding: it's (probably) all in the head In this paper we provide a psychological explanation for ?grounding observations??observations that are thought to provide evidence that there exists a relation of ground. Our explanation does not appeal to the presence of any such relation. Instead, it appeals to certain evolved cognitive mechanisms, along with the traditional modal relations of supervenience, necessitation and entailment. As usual, papers are in the Muniment room on Thursday at 3.00. Associate Professor Kristie Miller Senior ARC Research Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Mon May 23 14:32:27 2016 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 04:32:27 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] GREG RESTALL ACU philosophy seminar series Message-ID: ACU Philosophy Seminar Series Proofs and what they're good for Abstract: I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in thought that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof. Prof. Greg Restall Professor of Philosophy School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne WHEN: Friday May 27, 2.30 PM - 4.00 PM WHERE: Greg will be speaking in Melbourne. St Patrick's Lv 1 Room 69, 250 Victoria Parade, East Melbourne (Note special venue due to renovations) Talks are videolinked to other campus sites: Strathfield, MSM VC Room (E2.45 Room) North Sydney, MacKillop Level 16 TWH Building (8-20 Napier Street N. Syd) Canberra, Signadou 110 Ballarat Aquinas 503. Brisbane, McAuley AC.22 Enquiries: Steve Matthews (stephen.matthews at acu.edu.au) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue May 24 13:00:03 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 03:00:03 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Anik Waldow (Sydney) @ Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <089e0116076ee5b3af05338dc0a5@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Anik Waldow (Sydney) Moral Reflection as Perception: A Humean Account In this paper I argue that, within Hume?s framework, it makes sense to think of conflicts between differing sympathetic sentiments as naturally causing us to take up a moral perspective. The aim of developing this causal reading of how our moral capacities are produced is to show that capacities that require for their formation an engagement with history, society and culture can still be deemed natural because of the causal process that underlies their formation. To recognise this connection between the natural and the artificial is important, not simply because it puts us in a position to see that Hume?s concept of human nature paves the way for a dynamic conception of human development that stands in stark contrast to any form of biological essentialism. It also revels that, for him, the naturalisation of the human being ultimately revolves around the attempt of providing causal explanations that render intelligible that which seems to be unnatural about our lives as social, moral and reflective creatures. When: Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=czY3ZG9pZWd1NjdrcTRjNWtsdm1rNzZhcGMgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au Wed May 25 06:53:04 2016 From: david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au (David Macarthur) Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 20:53:04 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] REMINDER: Robert Audi talk at USYD, Muniment Room (S401), 11am FRI May 27th Message-ID: Prof. Robert Audi (UNotre Dame, ACU) will be presenting a talk in the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney this coming Friday. Title: "Moral Perception: Causal, Ontological, and Epistemic Dimensions" Abstract: What is the difference between merely seeing an action that is wrong?something possible for any sighted animal?and having a moralperception of such an action, a phenomenologically distinctive perceptual response that a person with moral sensibility would likely have in seeing a violent act toward an innocent fleeing person? Such wrongs seem quite perceptible, but wrongness is not an ?observable? property like color or shape, nor is ?wrong? an observation term. This presentation will extend and defend the theory of moral perception set out in my Moral Perception (Princeton, 2013). I will show, using concrete examples, how such perception is possible, how it is like and unlike other kinds of perception, and how it can be a basis for moral knowledge. One element in the theory draws on an analogy between perception and action. Another element clarifies moral perception by comparison with the perception of emotion. The theory also takes into account the significance of the perceiver?s ?background beliefs? as elements potentially biasing moral perception, and it clarifies the sense in which perception can be responsive to complex information without being tacitly inferential. The talk should interest people concerned with ethics and value theory, with the philosophy and psychology of perception, or with the scope and basis of knowledge. Time: 11am Fri, May 27. Place: Muniment Room, S401, Main Quad (upstairs under the clock tower) All welcome! Assoc. Professor David Macarthur Philosophy Department, SOPHI | FASS The University of Sydney, NSW, 2006 | Australia http://sydney.edu.au/arts/philosophy/staff/profiles/david.macarthur.php -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From fiona.jenkins at anu.edu.au Wed May 25 17:53:46 2016 From: fiona.jenkins at anu.edu.au (Fiona Jenkins) Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 07:53:46 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Teaching Opportunity Message-ID: An opportunity has arisen to teach a philosophy course on Nietzsche at ANU in Semester 2 2016 (lectures and tutorials, over 13 weeks). Suitably qualified candidates (PhD or close to completing PhD in this or a closely related area) should contact Associate Professor Fiona Jenkins with a CV and expression of interest, Fiona.Jenkins at anu.edu.au. Evidence of teaching ability and names of two referees should be included in the CV. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au Thu May 26 11:07:53 2016 From: Stephen.Matthews at acu.edu.au (Stephen Matthews) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 01:07:53 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] GREG RESTALL ACU PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR SERIES Message-ID: ACU Philosophy Seminar Series Greg Restall Professor of Philosophy School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne Proofs and what they're good for Abstract: I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in thought that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof. WHEN: Friday May 27, 2.30 PM - 4.00 PM WHERE: Greg will be speaking in Melbourne. St Patrick's Lv 1 Room 69, 250 Victoria Parade, East Melbourne (Note special venue due to renovations.) Talks are videolinked to other campus sites: Strathfield, MSM VC Room (E2.45 Room) North Sydney, MacKillop Level 16 TWH Building (8-20 Napier Street N. Syd) Canberra, Signadou 110 Ballarat Aquinas 503. Brisbane, McAuley AC.22 Enquiries: Steve Matthews (stephen.matthews at acu.edu.au) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu May 26 13:00:15 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 03:00:15 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Monima Chadha (Monash) @ Wed 1 Jun 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <94eb2c05e7fa4d67cd0533b5fd9e@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Monima Chadha (Monash) No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership Abhidharma-Buddhist philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a ?self? in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. I argue for a strong reading of the no-self view as a variety of no-subject or no-ownership view. The Buddhists are not just denying the diachronically unified and extended self but also minimal selfhood insofar as it associated with a sense of ownership and agency.The view is deeply counterintuitive and the Buddhists are acutely aware of this fact. Accordingly, the Abhidharma-Buddhist writings and contemporary reconstructions of the view are replete with attempts to explain the phenomenology of experience in a no-self world. The paper defends the no-ownership view using resources from contemporary discussions about sense (or lack thereof) of ownership. When: Wed 1 Jun 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=ZmFpNjRqaGMzZXEzaTk2Zms3dGl0dHQyMTQgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From m.valaris at unsw.edu.au Thu May 26 16:03:39 2016 From: m.valaris at unsw.edu.au (Markos Valaris) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 06:03:39 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Reminder: Robert Audi at UNSW, 27 May Message-ID: Robert Audi will be giving a talk that the UNSW Philosophy Seminar on 27 May. The venue is Morven Brown 310, and the time 2:30 to 4:00. Title and abstract: Understanding, Justification, and Self-Evidence: Adequate Understanding as a Basis of A Priori Justification Self-evidence is widely taken to be a status that marks propositions as capable of being justifiedly believed (and known) on the basis of understanding. This paper explicates and defends that view. The paper shows that the broadly linguistic kind of understanding implied by semantic comprehension of a formulation of a self-evident proposition does not entail being justified in believing it; that the kind of understanding adequate to yield such justification is multi-dimensional; and that there are many variables partly constitutive of adequate understanding-all having philosophical interest in themselves-which contribute to the kind and degree of understanding that a theory of self-evidence must account for. The paper also shows why self-evident propositions need not be obvious, need not be unprovable, and, far from being beyond dispute, can be a subject of rational disagreement. The concluding section shows how knowledge of self-evident propositions is possible even if, on the one hand, they are abstract and causally inert and, on the other, beliefs constituting knowledge must meet both causal and reliability conditions connected with their truthmakers. Hope to see you there! Markos Valaris Lecturer in Philosophy Associate Editor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy University of New South Wales Phone: +(61) 2 9385 2760 (office) Personal webpage: markosvalaris.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From tsol9898 at uni.sydney.edu.au Thu May 26 22:01:57 2016 From: tsol9898 at uni.sydney.edu.au (Toby Solomon) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 22:01:57 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Fwd: CfP: APPC 2016 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: *Call for Papers: *Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference 2016 *Deadline for Abstracts and Travel Funding: 31st July* *Basics: *The Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference 2016 will be held at the Australian National University in Canberra from Saturday 24th to Monday 26th September 2016 (with an opening plenary address on Friday 23rd of September). *Talks: *We invite abstract submissions on any philosophical topic (200 words maximum) from all postgraduate students currently enrolled at an Australasian university. Sessions will generally be 1 hour in length (30 mins speaking, 30 mins question and answer). There may be opportunities for shorter and longer session depending on demand, your preference can be indicated when submitting an abstract. *Diversity: *The conference organisers are committed to supporting diversity in philosophy and particularly encourage submissions from underrepresented groups in philosophy. *Poster Presentations: *The conference will involve a time slot dedicated to the presentation of posters in an informal circulate and talk format. Any attendee is welcome to present a poster (printing will be available at the conference for A3 size posters) as long as it is not on the same topic as a talk they are giving. We believe this will provide an excellent opportunity for those presenting less standard work or wishing to develop ideas not yet ready for full paper or talk presentations. *Travel Funding: *There will be a limited amount of travel funding available to cover travel costs for postgraduate speakers with preference given based on total travel distance. Speakers from within NSW will only be eligible for funding in extenuating circumstances (ACT residents are not eligible). Allocation of funds will take into account other funding sources available to attendees. Applications for travel funding can be submitted with registration at the link below. *Registration: *Registration is free and open to all graduate students and upper level undergraduate students (3rd year and honours) who wish to attend. You can register and submit an abstract here: http://goo.gl/forms/nhFBcbTDyFfMEd882 *Workshops: *The conference will include several workshops on philosophical craft and professional development for graduate students. If you would be interested in running a workshop and have relevant expertise please contact us at 2016APPC at gmail.com for more information (faculty most welcome). *Website: *Please visit our website here: http://philosophy.anu.edu.au/event/australasian-postgraduate-philosophy-conference Or to register and submit an abstract go here: http://goo.gl/forms/nhFBcbTDyFfMEd882 *Contacts: *For workshop suggestions, comments and general enquiries please email 2016APPC at gmail.com On behalf of the organising committee, *Toby Solomon* Committee Chair -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From lddp at outlook.com Thu May 26 23:57:11 2016 From: lddp at outlook.com (=?utf-8?B?bGF1cmEgZGVzaXLDqGUgZGkgcGFvbG8=?=) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 13:57:11 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Workshop: When Cognition Becomes Social Message-ID: Dear All, with great pleasure I invite you to the workshop When Cognition Becomes Social organised by Primate Cognition Team and held at the LiKo (Lichtenberg-Kolleg), into the splendid historic observatory, the 17 June 2016, h. 9:00 am Invited speakers are: Julia Ostner and Oliver Sch?lkeDavid LeavensHannes RakoczyKristin Andrews More info and abstract: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/539509.html The number of available spots is REALLY limited, so if you like to attend please send an e-mail as soon as possible to: Turan.Lackschewitz at zvw.uni-goettingen.de For any other information, please feel free to contact me directly (please, use the mail in the signature). Regards, Laura D. Di Paolo? ______________________________Laura Desir?e Di Paolo, Ph.D. ?"?Lichtenberg-Kolleg?"? Institute for Advanced Study DPZ, Deutsche PrimatenZentrumLeibniz-ScienceCampus?Georg-August? ?Universit?t? -? G?ttingen, Germany Dept. Philosophy"Sapienza", University of Rome - Rome, Italy lauradesiree.dipaolo at gmail.comhttps://sites.google.com/site/lauradesireedipaolo/ https://uni-goettingen.academia.edu/LauraDesir%C3%A9eDiPaolo mob. +49 015 25 65 92 602 (de) +39 328 92 14 042 (ita)skype: laura.desiree.di.paolo------------ Evolution & Cognition (Research Group) http://evolutioncognition.wordpress.com evolutionandcognition at gmail.com_______________________________CallSend SMSCall from mobileAdd to SkypeYou'll need Skype CreditFree via Skype -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri May 27 15:00:10 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 05:00:10 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Alexander Grossman @ Thu 2 Jun 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a11c12e3c03b3ed0533cbc8b8@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Alexander Grossman Title: "Conciliationism and Debunking: A Response to Bogardus" Abstract: Proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments think that the facts of evolution suggest that if moral realism is true, our moral beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Tomas Bogardus has proposed the Argument from Symmetry, a specific evolutionary debunking argument motivated by conciliationism about peer disagreement, on which the rational response to a certain sort of disagreement is to give up the disputed belief. According to Bogardus, the Argument should worry proponents of 'Representationalism,' who believe that all of our moral beliefs are formed on the basis of a mental intermediary like sentiment or gut feeling. Supposedly well-positioned to respond to the Argument are proponents of 'Rationalism,' who believe that at least some of our moral beliefs are formed on the basis of a direct apprehension of the moral truth. Bogardus has identified a plausible way of spelling out the evolutionary threat to moral realism, but has misjudged its power: as I will argue, if the Argument succeeds against Representationalism then it succeeds against Rationalism. When: Thu 2 Jun 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzY4cWplY3E1NmtwamNiOW82Z3A0OGI5azhsMGppYjlwNm9zajRiYTE4OHAzMGMxajhsMjNjZGkzNjQgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sjd at cybersydney.com.au Sun May 29 13:41:53 2016 From: sjd at cybersydney.com.au (Sandra Darroch) Date: Sun, 29 May 2016 13:41:53 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] June 4 Blackheath Philosophy Forum Message-ID: <574A6501.9080208@cybersydney.com.au> *BLACKHEATH PHILOSOPHY FORUM* blackheathphilosophy.org ** 4pm Saturday June 4 ** *"Love and Meaning?* ** *Our speaker, Sam Shaoall*, *Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sydney, will discuss: ?*Perennial philosophical questions about love remain unresolved. Is love an emotion, a mode of willing, or a special kind of cognition? Is love under our control, and can we be evaluated for it? Is love rational, or merely an expression of arbitrary passions? Is love a moral virtue, or a more mixed blessing? I begin to sort through these difficult questions by offering an account of love that rejects the common idea that love for persons is distinct from love for other kinds of objects, and that distinguishes love from other psychological phenomena via its connection to the perception of meaning.? ** ** *Come and join us for a stimulating talk and lively discussion *at the Hall at the Blackheath Neighbourhood Centre, cnr Gardiner Crescent & the Great Western Highway, 4pm-6pm, followed by informal discussion at the pub.Admission $10 includes a big afternoon tea before question time. Hall is heated.All welcome!** For more program details please go to blackheathphilosophy.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: