From philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au Mon May 16 08:49:03 2016 From: philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au (PhilosophyatWesternSydney) Date: Sun, 15 May 2016 22:49:03 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Philosophy at Western Sydney: Diego Bubbio Message-ID: Philosophy At Western Sydney ***Apologies for late posting*** Encountering the Author Diego Bubbio ? Sacrifice in the Post-Kantian Traditions. Perspectivism, Intersubjectivity and Recognition, Sunny Date: Wednesday 18 May 2016 Time: 3.30 pm to 5.00 pm Location: Western Sydney University, Building 3, Ground Level, Room 3.G.54, Bankstown Campus Respondents Dimitris Vardoulakis, Western Sydney University. Simon Lumsden, University of New South Wales. See webpage for full details http://www.westernsydney.edu.au/philosophy/home/events/encountering_the_author -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au Mon May 16 13:13:54 2016 From: david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au (David Macarthur) Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 03:13:54 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Robert Audi talk at USYD, Muniment Room (S401), 11am FRI May 27th Message-ID: Prof. Robert Audi (UNotre Dame, ACU) will be presenting a talk in the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney on Fri, May 27th. Title: "Moral Perception: Causal, Ontological, and Epistemic Dimensions" Abstract: What is the difference between merely seeing an action that is wrong?something possible for any sighted animal?and having a moralperception of such an action, a phenomenologically distinctive perceptual response that a person with moral sensibility would likely have in seeing a violent act toward an innocent fleeing person? Such wrongs seem quite perceptible, but wrongness is not an ?observable? property like color or shape, nor is ?wrong? an observation term. This presentation will extend and defend the theory of moral perception set out in my Moral Perception (Princeton, 2013). I will show, using concrete examples, how such perception is possible, how it is like and unlike other kinds of perception, and how it can be a basis for moral knowledge. One element in the theory draws on an analogy between perception and action. Another element clarifies moral perception by comparison with the perception of emotion. The theory also takes into account the significance of the perceiver?s ?background beliefs? as elements potentially biasing moral perception, and it clarifies the sense in which perception can be responsive to complex information without being tacitly inferential. The talk should interest people concerned with ethics and value theory, with the philosophy and psychology of perception, or with the scope and basis of knowledge. Time: 11am Place: Muniment Room, S401 (upstairs under the clock tower) All welcome! Assoc. Professor David Macarthur Philosophy Department, SOPHI | FASS The University of Sydney, NSW, 2006 | Australia http://sydney.edu.au/arts/philosophy/staff/profiles/david.macarthur.php -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue May 17 12:59:51 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 02:59:51 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Greg Restall (Melbourne) @ Wed 18 May 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <001a1138ec3e4bae37053300efd6@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Greg Restall (Melbourne) Title: Proofs and what they're good for Abstract: I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in reasoning that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof, including (1) how it is that a proof transmits warrant (2) Lewis Carroll's dilemma concerning Achilles and the Tortoise and the coherence of questioning basic proof rules like modus ponens, and (3) how we can avoid logical omniscience without committing ourselves to inconsistency. When: Wed 18 May 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, Sydney Uni Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=bGdldnVrc3R2ZHI0MDAzY2wwaDVqNTNwZzAgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Tue May 17 16:36:57 2016 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 16:36:57 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Colin Klein: Prediction, explanation, and cognitive ontology Thursday @ 3 Message-ID: <9E4A3F93-DAE0-4EB3-B5D9-70AE308A9CBB@yahoo.com> This coming Thursday?s current projects seminar will be Colin Klein presenting: Title: Prediction, explanation, and cognitive ontology Abstract: Yarkoni and Westfall have recently argued that cognitive neuroscience focuses too much on explanation at the expense of prediction. Advances in machine learning have made available powerful predictive tools, they claim, and we can use those tools to develop cognitive constructs that will be more useful for cognitive neuroscience. I disagree. Insofar as an ontological project is revisionary, it must focus on explanation (even at the expense of prediction). I show that this disagreement illuminates a heretofore implicit disconnect between how cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers think of the so-called problem of "cognitive ontology." I illustrate the point by discussing recent work on decoding words from whole-brain activation data. Time permitting, I will also have many things to say about the interpretations of double dissociations, and will continue a long-running streak of connecting neuroimaging to stuff that Paul Meehl said in the mid-1950s. As usual, papers are held in the Muniment Room at 3.00. Associate Professor Kristie Miller Senior ARC Research Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed May 18 14:59:57 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 18 May 2016 04:59:57 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Colin Klein @ Thu 19 May 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <047d7b15a607a97e66053316ba5d@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Colin Klein Title: Prediction, explanation, and cognitive ontology Abstract: Yarkoni and Westfall have recently argued that cognitive neuroscience focuses too much on explanation at the expense of prediction. Advances in machine learning have made available powerful predictive tools, they claim, and we can use those tools to develop cognitive constructs that will be more useful for cognitive neuroscience. I disagree. Insofar as an ontological project is revisionary, it must focus on explanation (even at the expense of prediction). I show that this disagreement illuminates a heretofore implicit disconnect between how cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers think of the so-called problem of "cognitive ontology." I illustrate the point by discussing recent work on decoding words from whole-brain activation data. Time permitting, I will also have many things to say about the interpretations of double dissociations, and will continue a long-running streak of connecting neuroimaging to stuff that Paul Meehl said in the mid-1950s. See More from Kristie Lyn Miller When: Thu 19 May 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzhkMmoyZzluNjRwMzZiOWc2MHM0NGI5azZrcmphYmEyODRyMzJiOW44a3NrYWdoaTY0czNnZGkzOG8gZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From m.valaris at unsw.edu.au Thu May 19 10:30:15 2016 From: m.valaris at unsw.edu.au (Markos Valaris) Date: Thu, 19 May 2016 00:30:15 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Robert Audi at UNSW, 27 May Message-ID: Hi everyone, Robert Audi will be giving a talk that the UNSW Philosophy Seminar on 27 May. The venue is Morven Brown 310, and the time 2:30 to 4:00. Title and abstract: Understanding, Justification, and Self-Evidence: Adequate Understanding as a Basis of A Priori Justification Self-evidence is widely taken to be a status that marks propositions as capable of being justifiedly believed (and known) on the basis of understanding. This paper explicates and defends that view. The paper shows that the broadly linguistic kind of understanding implied by semantic comprehension of a formulation of a self-evident proposition does not entail being justified in believing it; that the kind of understanding adequate to yield such justification is multi-dimensional; and that there are many variables partly constitutive of adequate understanding-all having philosophical interest in themselves-which contribute to the kind and degree of understanding that a theory of self-evidence must account for. The paper also shows why self-evident propositions need not be obvious, need not be unprovable, and, far from being beyond dispute, can be a subject of rational disagreement. The concluding section shows how knowledge of self-evident propositions is possible even if, on the one hand, they are abstract and causally inert and, on the other, beliefs constituting knowledge must meet both causal and reliability conditions connected with their truthmakers. Hope to see you there! Markos Valaris Lecturer in Philosophy Associate Editor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy University of New South Wales Phone: +(61) 2 9385 2760 (office) Personal webpage: markosvalaris.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu May 19 13:00:05 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 19 May 2016 03:00:05 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Anik Waldow (Sydney) @ Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <001a113a9812d1ed330533292b6d@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Anik Waldow (Sydney) When: Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=czY3ZG9pZWd1NjdrcTRjNWtsdm1rNzZhcGMgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri May 20 14:59:52 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 20 May 2016 04:59:52 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: James Norton @ Thu 26 May 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a113db5ee0ab18205333ef60f@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: James Norton TBA When: Thu 26 May 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzYwcDMwZDFvNm9yamViOWc2b3NqMGI5azhsMzRjYmExNmNyNDJiOW83NTI0YWNoaTcxMWs0ZGhvNnMgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au Mon May 16 08:49:03 2016 From: philosophy at westernsydney.edu.au (PhilosophyatWesternSydney) Date: Sun, 15 May 2016 22:49:03 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Philosophy at Western Sydney: Diego Bubbio Message-ID: Philosophy At Western Sydney ***Apologies for late posting*** Encountering the Author Diego Bubbio ? Sacrifice in the Post-Kantian Traditions. Perspectivism, Intersubjectivity and Recognition, Sunny Date: Wednesday 18 May 2016 Time: 3.30 pm to 5.00 pm Location: Western Sydney University, Building 3, Ground Level, Room 3.G.54, Bankstown Campus Respondents Dimitris Vardoulakis, Western Sydney University. Simon Lumsden, University of New South Wales. See webpage for full details http://www.westernsydney.edu.au/philosophy/home/events/encountering_the_author -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au Mon May 16 13:13:54 2016 From: david.macarthur at sydney.edu.au (David Macarthur) Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 03:13:54 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Robert Audi talk at USYD, Muniment Room (S401), 11am FRI May 27th Message-ID: Prof. Robert Audi (UNotre Dame, ACU) will be presenting a talk in the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney on Fri, May 27th. Title: "Moral Perception: Causal, Ontological, and Epistemic Dimensions" Abstract: What is the difference between merely seeing an action that is wrong?something possible for any sighted animal?and having a moralperception of such an action, a phenomenologically distinctive perceptual response that a person with moral sensibility would likely have in seeing a violent act toward an innocent fleeing person? Such wrongs seem quite perceptible, but wrongness is not an ?observable? property like color or shape, nor is ?wrong? an observation term. This presentation will extend and defend the theory of moral perception set out in my Moral Perception (Princeton, 2013). I will show, using concrete examples, how such perception is possible, how it is like and unlike other kinds of perception, and how it can be a basis for moral knowledge. One element in the theory draws on an analogy between perception and action. Another element clarifies moral perception by comparison with the perception of emotion. The theory also takes into account the significance of the perceiver?s ?background beliefs? as elements potentially biasing moral perception, and it clarifies the sense in which perception can be responsive to complex information without being tacitly inferential. The talk should interest people concerned with ethics and value theory, with the philosophy and psychology of perception, or with the scope and basis of knowledge. Time: 11am Place: Muniment Room, S401 (upstairs under the clock tower) All welcome! Assoc. Professor David Macarthur Philosophy Department, SOPHI | FASS The University of Sydney, NSW, 2006 | Australia http://sydney.edu.au/arts/philosophy/staff/profiles/david.macarthur.php -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Tue May 17 12:59:51 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 02:59:51 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Greg Restall (Melbourne) @ Wed 18 May 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <001a1138ec3e4bae37053300efd6@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Greg Restall (Melbourne) Title: Proofs and what they're good for Abstract: I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in reasoning that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof, including (1) how it is that a proof transmits warrant (2) Lewis Carroll's dilemma concerning Achilles and the Tortoise and the coherence of questioning basic proof rules like modus ponens, and (3) how we can avoid logical omniscience without committing ourselves to inconsistency. When: Wed 18 May 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, Sydney Uni Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=bGdldnVrc3R2ZHI0MDAzY2wwaDVqNTNwZzAgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kristie_miller at yahoo.com Tue May 17 16:36:57 2016 From: kristie_miller at yahoo.com (Kristie Miller) Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 16:36:57 +1000 Subject: [SydPhil] Colin Klein: Prediction, explanation, and cognitive ontology Thursday @ 3 Message-ID: <9E4A3F93-DAE0-4EB3-B5D9-70AE308A9CBB@yahoo.com> This coming Thursday?s current projects seminar will be Colin Klein presenting: Title: Prediction, explanation, and cognitive ontology Abstract: Yarkoni and Westfall have recently argued that cognitive neuroscience focuses too much on explanation at the expense of prediction. Advances in machine learning have made available powerful predictive tools, they claim, and we can use those tools to develop cognitive constructs that will be more useful for cognitive neuroscience. I disagree. Insofar as an ontological project is revisionary, it must focus on explanation (even at the expense of prediction). I show that this disagreement illuminates a heretofore implicit disconnect between how cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers think of the so-called problem of "cognitive ontology." I illustrate the point by discussing recent work on decoding words from whole-brain activation data. Time permitting, I will also have many things to say about the interpretations of double dissociations, and will continue a long-running streak of connecting neuroimaging to stuff that Paul Meehl said in the mid-1950s. As usual, papers are held in the Muniment Room at 3.00. Associate Professor Kristie Miller Senior ARC Research Fellow Joint Director, the Centre for Time School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney Australia Room 407, A 14 kmiller at usyd.edu.au kristie_miller at yahoo.com Ph: +612 9036 9663 http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Wed May 18 14:59:57 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Wed, 18 May 2016 04:59:57 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Colin Klein @ Thu 19 May 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <047d7b15a607a97e66053316ba5d@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Colin Klein Title: Prediction, explanation, and cognitive ontology Abstract: Yarkoni and Westfall have recently argued that cognitive neuroscience focuses too much on explanation at the expense of prediction. Advances in machine learning have made available powerful predictive tools, they claim, and we can use those tools to develop cognitive constructs that will be more useful for cognitive neuroscience. I disagree. Insofar as an ontological project is revisionary, it must focus on explanation (even at the expense of prediction). I show that this disagreement illuminates a heretofore implicit disconnect between how cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers think of the so-called problem of "cognitive ontology." I illustrate the point by discussing recent work on decoding words from whole-brain activation data. Time permitting, I will also have many things to say about the interpretations of double dissociations, and will continue a long-running streak of connecting neuroimaging to stuff that Paul Meehl said in the mid-1950s. See More from Kristie Lyn Miller When: Thu 19 May 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzhkMmoyZzluNjRwMzZiOWc2MHM0NGI5azZrcmphYmEyODRyMzJiOW44a3NrYWdoaTY0czNnZGkzOG8gZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From m.valaris at unsw.edu.au Thu May 19 10:30:15 2016 From: m.valaris at unsw.edu.au (Markos Valaris) Date: Thu, 19 May 2016 00:30:15 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Robert Audi at UNSW, 27 May Message-ID: Hi everyone, Robert Audi will be giving a talk that the UNSW Philosophy Seminar on 27 May. The venue is Morven Brown 310, and the time 2:30 to 4:00. Title and abstract: Understanding, Justification, and Self-Evidence: Adequate Understanding as a Basis of A Priori Justification Self-evidence is widely taken to be a status that marks propositions as capable of being justifiedly believed (and known) on the basis of understanding. This paper explicates and defends that view. The paper shows that the broadly linguistic kind of understanding implied by semantic comprehension of a formulation of a self-evident proposition does not entail being justified in believing it; that the kind of understanding adequate to yield such justification is multi-dimensional; and that there are many variables partly constitutive of adequate understanding-all having philosophical interest in themselves-which contribute to the kind and degree of understanding that a theory of self-evidence must account for. The paper also shows why self-evident propositions need not be obvious, need not be unprovable, and, far from being beyond dispute, can be a subject of rational disagreement. The concluding section shows how knowledge of self-evident propositions is possible even if, on the one hand, they are abstract and causally inert and, on the other, beliefs constituting knowledge must meet both causal and reliability conditions connected with their truthmakers. Hope to see you there! Markos Valaris Lecturer in Philosophy Associate Editor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy University of New South Wales Phone: +(61) 2 9385 2760 (office) Personal webpage: markosvalaris.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Thu May 19 13:00:05 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Thu, 19 May 2016 03:00:05 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: Anik Waldow (Sydney) @ Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 - 14:30 (Seminars) Message-ID: <001a113a9812d1ed330533292b6d@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: Anik Waldow (Sydney) When: Wed 25 May 2016 13:00 ? 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Where: Muniment Room, Quadrangle Building A14, University of Sydney Calendar: Seminars Who: * Brian Hedden- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=czY3ZG9pZWd1NjdrcTRjNWtsdm1rNzZhcGMgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Seminars. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From calendar-notification at google.com Fri May 20 14:59:52 2016 From: calendar-notification at google.com (Google Calendar) Date: Fri, 20 May 2016 04:59:52 +0000 Subject: [SydPhil] Notification: James Norton @ Thu 26 May 2016 15:00 - 16:30 (Current Projects) Message-ID: <001a113db5ee0ab18205333ef60f@google.com> This is a notification for: Title: James Norton TBA When: Thu 26 May 2016 15:00 ? 16:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney Calendar: Current Projects Who: * Kristie Miller- creator Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzYwcDMwZDFvNm9yamViOWc2b3NqMGI5azhsMzRjYmExNmNyNDJiOW83NTI0YWNoaTcxMWs0ZGhvNnMgZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email at the account sydphil at arts.usyd.edu.au because you are subscribed for notifications on calendar Current Projects. To stop receiving these emails, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for this calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to modify your RSVP response. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: