[SydPhil] Helen Beebee: AGENT PROBABILITIES AND FREE WILL

[Kristie Miller]

Thursday 3.00-4.30 in the muniment room:

Helen Beebee:

AGENT PROBABILITIES AND FREE WILL
Evidential decision theorists — and some causal decision theorists — hold that we need to conceive agents as ascribing probabilities to the prospective alternative actions about which they are deliberating. But those probabilities must not be constrained by any facts about the past: the agent must conceive her prospective action as ‘an ultimate and the only ultimate contingency’, as Ramsey put it. Unfortunately, however, existing accounts of what agent probabilities are supposed to be — and how they are supposed to override or render otiose what seem to be perfectly reasonable credences that violate this independence requirement on agent probabilities — are unsatisfactory. I’m going to try and do a bit better.






Associate Professor Kristie Miller
Senior ARC Research Fellow
Joint Director, the Centre for Time
School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and
The Centre for Time
The University of Sydney
Sydney Australia
Room 407, A 14

kmiller at usyd.edu.au
kristie_miller at yahoo.com
Ph: +612 9036 9663
http://www.kristiemiller.net/KristieMiller2/Home_Page.html















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