[SydPhil] Reminder: Charles Travis (Kings College London) @ Wed 17 Apr 2013 15:30 - 17:30 (Seminars)
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Tue Apr 16 15:29:49 AEST 2013
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Title: Charles Travis (Kings College London)
Do Individual Beliefs Have Internal Images?
An idea of Wittgenstein’s: Given the questions (e.g.) belief ascriptions
speak to, there is no reason to expect what they ascribe to correspond in
any interesting or significant way with any identifiable intracranial
states or happenings. There is a viewpoint from which this seems at best
perverse. It is incarnated in something known as the Representational
Theory of Mind. After setting out that theory, this essay works to make
Wittgenstein’s idea plausible, or at least reasonable, correspondingly RTM
plausibly considerably more than there is any reason to think so. It works
in this direction by borrowing, and working out, some ideas of Frege’s—very
broadly speaking, ideas on what is, what not, a psychological question; in
large part ideas on the generality of thought and the particularity of what
thought is about. Later Wittgenstein is generally much endebted to Frege.
Here is one area where the debt shows.
When: Wed 17 Apr 2013 15:30 – 17:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: S401, Level 4, via Lobby B (or Southern Vestibule), Quadrangle
Building, University Place, The University of Sydney.
* samuel.thomas.baron at gmail.com- creator
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