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<p>Hi everyone, </p>
<p>This week's speaker in the University of Sydney Philosophy Seminar Series is Stephanie Sheintul, (University of Adelaide)
</p>
<p>The title of the talk is "<span style="color:black">Rights, Powers, and Paternalism</span>". Here is an abstract for the talk:
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<p style="margin-left:36.0pt"><span style="color:black">Abstract: It is controversial when we are morally permitted to act for another’s good. Some suggest that we are rarely permitted to do so given that competent adults have a<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><i>pro
tanto</i> claim right to be the only ones to act only or primarily for their own good. Others suggest that people have a special moral power over their good – what has been called the<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><i>power of prudential exclusion</i> (PPE)
– such that they can exclude us from acting for their good when it would otherwise be permissible for us to do so. I have three aims in this paper. The first is to argue that, rather than the aforementioned right, competent adults more plausibly have a<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><i>pro
tanto</i> claim right against others acting to promote their good for a particular<span class="apple-converted-space"><i> </i></span>set of well-being-related second-order reasons. Specifically, according to this right, others must not promote their good for
the reason that (a) they are unlikely to (or will not) deliberate, judge, or act in their best interests and/or that (b) their judgment or decision about what is valuable or in their best interests is mistaken and/or inferior to the acting agent’s. The second
is to introduce a corollary power to the PPE – what I call<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><i>the power of prudential inclusion (PPI) –<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span></i>which holds that we have the moral power to give others permission
to act for our good when it would otherwise be impermissible for them to do so. The third is to sketch a novel rights-based anti-paternalist account based on the right that I (partly) defend we have.</span></p>
<p>The seminar will take place at 3:30pm on Wednesday March 26 in the Philosophy Seminar Room (N494).
</p>
<p>Enquiries about the seminar series can be directed to <a href="mailto:ryan.cox@sydney.edu.au">
ryan.cox@sydney.edu.au</a></p>
<p>Ryan Cox <br>
Associate Lecturer in Philosophy <br>
Discipline of Philosophy <br>
School of Humanities <br>
University of Sydney <br>
<a href="mailto:ryan.cox@sydney.edu.au">ryan.cox@sydney.edu.au</a> </p>
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